Felker, L

Heating/Piping/Air Conditioning Engineering. Vol. 76, no. 7, pp. 31-39. July 2004

A building's existing damper system can offer much in terms of protection in the event of an airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attack-or an accident that releases harmful airborne contaminants to the indoor environment. Control strategies, which involve the use of air-handling units and fire and smoke systems, are described in this article. Additionally, advice specific to hospital environments is provided.

Yen, J

Communications of the ACM. Vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 32-35. Mar. 2004

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the reach and effects of terrorism and made protecting the security of citizens a top priority and a major challenge for many governments worldwide. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security is an exemplar response by the U.S. to such a challenge, drawing upon the intellectual and technological capabilities of scholars, scientists, and technologists. In this special section, we highlight some of the key emerging technologies related to several critical areas in the realm of homeland security.

Frittelli, JF

Performer: Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. 5 Dec 2003. 30p. Report: RL-31733

This report provides background information and discusses potential issues for Congress on the topic of port security, which has emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on U.S. homeland security. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability to terrorist attack of U.S. ports and the ships in them. The issue for Congress is providing oversight on port security and proposals for improving it. Port security legislation can have significant implications for public safety, the war on terrorism, the U.S. and global economy, and federal, state, and local homeland security responsibilities and expenditures.

Nicholson, BD

Performer: Naval War Coll., Newport, RI. Joint Military Operations Dept. 16 May 2003. 33p.

Intelligence is critical to resolving the competing interests of security and prosperity and is the basis for a risk management approach to security. This essay looks at intelligence and how it is or might be employed to help minimize the risk of a maritime terrorism and how the resources of the intelligence community contribute to reducing the force to space ratio. Integration of law enforcement and intelligence is fundamental to the success of homeland security. Terrorism does not recognize borders, but the U.S. division of responsibilities has created a seam in our defenses. Some aspects of globalization have resulted in blurring of traditional intelligence and law enforcement roles, but some additional fundamental changes are required. The Navy/Coast Guard counter-narcotics mission demonstrates a practical solution to joint military-law enforcement operations. The USA Patriot Act has facilitated greater sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information. Command and control plays an important part in properly using intelligence. The new Terrorist Threat Integration Center has been created at the strategic level; the Joint Interagency Task Force provides an excellent framework at the operational and tactical level. The Coast Guard has developed the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) concept to reconcile security and prosperity issues in the man time environment. MDA begins overseas. Foreign intelligence operations, regional security cooperation, and leveraging regional relationships are critical to the doctrine of pre-emption and successful maritime homeland defense.

HIRSCH, D; LOCHBAUM, D; LYMAN, E

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 45-51, May /June, 2003

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it was widely thought that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would adopt tighter security regulations for nuclear power plants. This has not occurred. The design basis threat (DBT) guidelines have long mandated minimal security efforts: Facilities should be able to withstand attack by three individuals armed with automatic weapons, aided by conspirators from within (a substantial menace). The guidelines do not consider assaults carried out by larger teams, aircraft, or boats. Tests conducted by the NRC, called Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations, have raised alarms. At half of the potentially threatened sites, mock assailants have been able to take over plants and simulate enough damage to cause reactor meltdown, even with up to 6 months of advanced warning. Despite obvious weaknesses, the nuclear industry and NRC have lobbied Congress to prevent higher defensive standards. The belief is that spending money on these measures might make expansion of nuclear reactors more difficult. Although the NRC continues to study possible effects of a terrorist airline attack on plants or spent fuel pools, no specific goals have been announced. The NRC refuses to impose no-fly zones over these facilities or to ask for antiaircraft systems. It continues to insist the plants are hardened to the point where no conceivable attack would release radiation. Another problem is the manpower issue. Security personnel at nuclear plants are being pushed to their limits by excessive overtime demands. They are often poorly trained and paid and consequently suffer from low morale. The new Office of Homeland Security, the Defense Department, and Congress must share the blame for any inaction. All calls for closer scrutiny are being muffled in the name of national security. Ultimately, the public must demand more disclosure and accountability from these agencies.

Copeland, C; Cody, B

Performer: Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Resources, Science, and Industry Div. May 2003. 10p. Report: RS-21026

Damage to or destruction of the nation's water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such problems has increased since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas, and ownership and operation responsibility are both public and private but are overwhelmingly nonfederal. Since the attacks, federal dam operators and water and wastewater utilities have been under heightened security conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. Policymakers are considering a number of options, including enhanced physical security, better communication and coordination, and research. A key issue is how additional protections and resources directed at public and private sector priorities will be funded. In response, Congress has approved $410 million in funds for security at water infrastructure facilities and passed a bill requiring drinking water utilities to conduct security vulnerability assessments Congress also created a Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities to coordinate information to secure the nation's critical infrastructure, including the water sector. Continuing attention to these issues in the 108th Congress is anticipated. Current interest is focusing on bills concerning security of wastewater utilities. This report will be updated as warranted.

Brummond, S

Performer: Army War Coll., Carlisle Barracks, PA. 16 Mar 2003. 40p.

The challenges of improving homeland security in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and subsequent events, such as the anthrax outbreak and sniper shootings, have revealed numerous deficiencies of governmental functioning in the prevention and response to terrorist attacks, as well as operational adaptation by response agencies and officials at all levels of government. The defense of this nation and the war on terrorism ultimately involves every agency and level of government. We can anticipate numerous changes in the intergovernmental system and interorganizational structure. This strategic research paper analyzes the post-September 11 challenges faced by the U.S. national security apparatus and the new threat environment, homeland security and strategy, and recommends the decision-making structure that fits best.

Information World Review; (188) Feb 2003, p.2

The coverage of Thomson's West Publishing legal databases has been extended to include US homeland security and anti-terrorism. Westlaw's Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism resources will draw on a wide range of legal areas, including immigration and border security, criminal law and procedure, civil rights, government contracts, administrative law, privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, labour/employment, civil service law, insurance and military law. (Quotes from original text)

Ackleson, Jason

Knowledge, Technology, and Policy; 16 (1) Spring 2003, pp.56-74

This paper offers preliminary cross-disciplinary research into the technological and policy dimensions of the U.S. border security regime in the post-September 11th era. Complex advances in security and surveillance technologies - comprising so-called "Smart Borders" - have emerged as preferred policy solutions to the difficult problem of screening for terrorist incursions into the United States through air and landborders while maintaining flows of goods and individuals under globalization. Beginning with an analysis of the defined threats and solutions to border security, the paper moves to discuss three new technologically-oriented control systems: surveillance, biometrics, and information technology. Their development is analyzed through a policy framework which relies on the concept of a "focusing event", crises like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In so doing, it probes the important nexus between post-crisis public policy formation, values, and technological development. It then evaluates the prospects for effectiveimplementation of these measures within the context of border politics, the pressures of globalization, and an open democratic society. (Original abstract)

Baker, DL

Performer: Army War Coll., Carlisle Barracks, PA. 9 Apr 2002. 42p.

The U.S. is being drawn ever deeper into the war on terrorism. Terrorism is predicted to be the primary threat to the U.S. for the foreseeable future. The recent attacks on the U.S. homeland, the USS Cole bombing, and the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa indicate that the stakes are getting higher and higher. The war in Afghanistan demonstrates to the world our resolve in winning the war. But this is only a first step. The war on terrorism will likely be long term and will not be won easily. This is a new kind of war. It will not only be fought on a traditional battlefield with traditional opponents with traditional weapons. It will also be fought on Main Street America and in cyberspace and it will be fought against opponents we can't see or even envision. It will be won with technology, some of which is yet to be developed. But this war will only be as effective as the policies guiding it. The instruments of power must be wielded in new and different ways to achieve our goals. Significant changes in policies and strategies are required to effectively utilize and synergize all the instruments of power. This paper will evaluate current and evolving policies and trends with respect to counterterrorism.

Performer: National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC. 2002. 2 CD-ROMs.

The Comprehensive Reference Resource (CRR) is designed to provide a reference resource for our nation's leadership, emergency responders, and supporting practitioners to learn what happened on September 11, 2001 and how they can better prepare their communities for the threat and consequences of terrorism.

Performer: Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Jan 1997. 29p.

This edition of Terrorism in the United State chronicles significant terrorism-related events occurring within the United States during 1997, It also includes articles that span the broad range of issues related to the terrorist threat facing the United States. These articles focus on the growth of so-called Common Law Courts, the designation of 30 foreign terrorist organizations pursuant to provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the technique of rendering terrorists from abroad. Focus articles also discuss the dangers posed by secondary explosive devices targeting first responders and the impact of hoaxes involving weapons of mass destruction. In addition, this report provides statistical data relating to terrorism within the United States. This material has been drawn from FBI records to provide a historical framework for the discussion of terrorism presented in this report.

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report [Morb. Mortal. Weekly Rep.]. Vol. 53, no. 35, pp. 815-817. 10 Sep 2004.

On September 11, 2001, an estimated 13,000--15,000 persons successfully evacuated the two World Trade Center (WTC) towers. Because full-scale evacuations of such buildings are rare, little is known about how readily and rapidly these buildings can be evacuated and what factors serve as facilitators or barriers to the process. In 2002, the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University and CDC initiated The World Trade Center Evacuation Study, a multiyear qualitative and quantitative research study designed to assess factors that affected evacuation of the two WTC towers. This report summarizes qualitative data collected from Phase I of the study, which suggested that improved preparedness at the individual, organizational, and building environmental levels can facilitate rapid evacuation. Completion of Phase II of the study, together with other research efforts, should help workers, management, and local authorities develop and evaluate model emergency preparedness programs for high-rise occupancies.

Thorne, CD; Oliver, M; Al-Ibrahim, M; Gucer, PW; McDiarmid, MA

Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine [J. Occup. Environ. Med.]. Vol. 46, no. 7, pp. 668-676. Jul 2004.

Clinicians have been the primary focus of health care worker training in response to the 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks. However, many nonclinical hospital workers also are critical in providing medical care during any large-scale emergency. We designed a training program, guided by focus groups, to provide them with information to recognize unusual events and to protect themselves. We compared four different training methods: workbook, video, lecture, and a small-group discussion. One hundred and ninety-one workers participated. After the training, they were more confident in their employer's preparedness to respond to a terrorist attack but specific knowledge did not change substantially. Fortunately, the self-directed workbook (the more economical and least disruptive method) was as effective as the other methods. Our experience may be useful to others who are planning terrorism-preparedness training programs.

Lemire, SW; Barr, JR; Ashley, DL; Olson, CT; Hayes, TL

Journal of Analytical Toxicology [J. Anal. Toxicol.]. Vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 320-326. Jul-Aug 2004.

The nitrogen mustards bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (HN1), bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (HN2), and tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (HN3) have the potential to be used as chemical terrorism agents because of their extreme vesicant properties. We modified a previously reported method to incorporate automated solid-phase extraction, improve chromatography, and include the urinary metabolite for HN3. The improved method was used to measure levels of the urinary metabolites N-ethyldiethanolamine (EDEA), N-methyldiethanolamine (MDEA), and triethanolamine (TEA) in rats dosed with HN1, HN2, and HN3, respectively, and to establish background levels of EDEA, MDEA, and TEA in human urine samples from a population with no known exposure to nitrogen mustards. Rat dosing experiments confirmed that EDEA, MDEA, and TEA could be detected in urine for at least 48 h after exposure to HN1, HN2, and HN3, respectively. Substantial amounts of EDEA (89 ng/mL), MDEA (170 ng/mL), and TEA (1105 ng/mL) were measured in the urine of rats exposed to 10 mg HN1, HN2, and HN3, respectively, 48 h after exposure. The background concentrations for TEA in the human population ranged from below the limit of detection (LOD 3 ng/mL) to approximately 6500 ng/mL. Neither EDEA (LOD 0.4 ng/mL) nor MDEA (LOD 0.8 ng/mL) was detected above the LOD in the human samples.

Sadik, OA; Wanekaya, AK; Andreescu, S

Journal of Environmental Monitoring [J. Environ. Monit.]. Vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 513-522. Jun 2004.

Due to the increased threats of chemical and biological agents of injury by terrorist organizations, a significant effort is underway to develop tools that can be used to detect and effectively combat chemical and biochemical toxins. In addition to the right mix of policies and training of medical personnel on how to recognize symptoms of biochemical warfare agents, the major success in combating terrorism still lies in the prevention, early detection and the efficient and timely response using reliable analytical technologies and powerful therapies for minimizing the effects in the event of an attack. The public and regulatory agencies expect reliable methodologies and devices for public security. Today's systems are too bulky or slow to meet the "detect-to-warn" needs for first responders such as soldiers and medical personnel. This paper presents the challenges in monitoring technologies for warfare agents and other toxins. It provides an overview of how advances in environmental analytical methodologies could be adapted to design reliable sensors for public safety and environmental surveillance. The paths to designing sensors that meet the needs of today's measurement challenges are analyzed using examples of novel sensors, autonomous cell-based toxicity monitoring, 'Lab-on-a-Chip' devices and conventional environmental analytical techniques. Finally, in order to ensure that the public and legal authorities are provided with quality data to make informed decisions, guidelines are provided for assessing data quality and quality assurance using the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US-EPA) methodologies.

Hintch, B

Compliance Magazine [Compliance Mag.]. Vol. 11, no. 5, p. 21. May 2004.

It has been almost three years since the events of Sept. 11, and the protective clothing industry and regulatory bodies have responded with improved equipment, services and best practices guidelines. Developments within the protective clothing industry have also allowed manufacturers to offer services and product lines that serve the needs of first responders.

Ciraulo, DL; Frykberg, ER; Feliciano, DV; Knuth, TE; Richart, CM; Westmoreland, CD; Williams, KA

Journal of Trauma [J. Trauma]. Vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 1033-1041. May 2004.

Objective: The goal of this survey was to establish a benchmark for trauma surgeons' level of operational understanding of the command structure for a prehospital incident, a mass casualty incident (MCI), and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The survey was distributed before the World Trade Center destruction on September 11, 2001. Methods: The survey was developed by the authors and reviewed by a statistician for clarity and performance. The survey was sent to the membership of the 2000 Eastern Association for the Surgery of Trauma spring mailing, with two subsequent mailings and a final sampling at the Eastern Association for the Surgery of Trauma 2001 meeting. Of 723 surveys mailed, 243 were returned and statistically analyzed (significance indicated by p < 0.05). Results: No statistical difference existed between level of designation of a trauma center (state or American College of Surgeons) and a facility's level of preparedness for MCIs or WMD. Physicians in communities with chemical plants, railways, and waterway traffic were statistically more likely to work at facilities with internal disaster plans addressing chemical and biological threats. Across all variables, physicians with military training were significantly better prepared for response to catastrophic events. With the exception of cyanide (50%), less than 30% of the membership was prepared to manage exposure to a nerve agent, less than 50% was prepared to manage illness from intentional biological exposure, and only 73% understood and were prepared to manage blast injury. Mobile medical response teams were present in 46% of the respondents' facilities, but only 30% of those teams deployed a trauma surgeon. Approximately 70% of the membership had been involved in an MCI, although only 60% understood the command structure for a prehospital incident. Only 33% of the membership had training regarding hazardous materials. Of interest, 76% and 65%, respectively, felt that education about MCIs and WMD should be included in residency training. Conclusion: A facility's level of pre-paredness for MCIs or WMD was not related to level of designation as a trauma center, but may be positively influenced by local physicians with prior military background. Benchmark information from this survey will provide the architecture for the development and implementation of further training in these areas for trauma surgeons.

Elcock, D; Klemic, GA; Taboas, AL

Environmental Science & Technology [Environ. Sci. Technol.]. Vol. 38, no. 9, pp. 2505-2512. 1 May 2004.

The detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could produce significant social and economic damage, the extent of which would depend largely on how quickly and effectively cleanup levels were established and on public acceptance of those levels. This paper shows that current radiological cleanup laws and regulations, models for converting dose or risk goals to cleanup concentrations, and existing site-specific criteria were not designed specifically for RDD cleanups but, absent changes, would apply by default. The goals and approaches of these legal and methodological structures often conflict; using them in response to terrorism could undermine public confidence, cause delays, and produce unnecessary costs or unacceptable cleanups. RDD cleanups would involve immediate priorities not envisioned in the existing radiological cleanup framework, such as balancing radiation risks with the health, economic, and other societal impacts associated with access to the infrastructure necessary to sustain society (e.g., hospitals, bridges, utilities). To minimize the achievement of terrorism goals, the elements of an RDD cleanup response - including updating existing legal/regulatory structures to clarify federal authority, goals, and methods for developing RDD cleanup criteria - must be in place soon; given the complexity of the issues and the potential societal impact, this effort should be expedited.

Lachance, PA

Toxicology Letters [Toxicol. Lett.]. Vol. 150, no. 1, pp. 25-27. Apr 2004.

Nutraceuticals are naturally occurring/derived bioactive compounds that are reported to have health benefits. The delivery systems for nutraceuticals are foods (functional foods), supplements, or both. Drugs are designed to have medicinal properties for the prevention and treatment of identified diseases or signs and symptoms of disease. Counterfeit drugs contain either placebo, materials not identified in the labeling or substandard or impure materials, which may produce untoward pharmacological or toxicological effects. In addition, the consumer has the right to microbiological safety and prevention from adverse exposure to hazardous chemical(s), and other adverse compounds. Nutraceutical/drug delivery systems are viewed as approaches to (1) enhanced consumer health, (2) decreased healthcare costs, and (3) enhanced economic development. Therefore, the nutra/pharma/ceutical industry is reliant upon a strong underpinning of diversified research that addresses safety and assures chemical and biological efficacy. Significant safety through traceability can be assured by the coupling of the technologies of (a) global positioning (GPS); (b) bar/chip coding; and (c) hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) management, coupled to rapid nanotechnology marker assays now under development.

Hodge, JG Jr; Brown, EF; O'Connell, JP

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 73-80. 2004.

Effective bioterrorism planning, prevention, and response require information sharing between various entities, ranging from public health authorities and health-care workers to national security and law enforcement officials. While the source of much information exchanged may be nonidentifiable, many entities legitimately need access to personally identifiable health information (or "protected health information" [PHI]) in planning for and responding to a bioterrorism event. The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows for essential exchanges of health data during a public health emergency while protecting against unnecessary disclosures of PHI. In the event of a bioterrorist attack, the Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose PHI without individual authorization in the following instances: (1) for treatment by health-care providers, (2) to avert a serious threat to health or safety, (3) to public health authorities for public health purposes, (4) to protect national security, (5) to law enforcement under certain conditions, and (6) for judicial or administrative proceedings. Despite these favorable disclosure provisions, some privacy challenges remain. The flow of PHI may be slowed by misunderstandings of the Privacy Rule's accounting requirement. In addition, in a bioterrorism scenario, nontraditional entities may find themselves acting as health-care providers, triggering Privacy Rule provisions. Finally, the potential for de facto disclosures of individuals' disease or exposure status increases where conspicuous treatment methods, isolation, or quarantine are implemented without additional measures to protect privacy. Understanding the Privacy Rule's impact on bioterrorism planning and response ensures that various entities can conduct their activities with needed information while still protecting individual privacy.

Kahn, LH

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 81-85. 2004.

Over the next 10 years, the United States will spend $6 billion to develop countermeasures against biological and chemical weapons. Much of this research on highly virulent pathogens will be done in academic settings around the country. This article explores the challenges in ensuring secrecy to protect national security while accommodating the right of local communities to have access to safety information regarding select agents and laboratory-acquired infections. Secrecy has been defended as being vital for protecting national security. Problems with secrecy can include the misinterpretation of intentions, particularly in laboratories located in nuclear weapons design facilities, and the restricted access to information relevant to public health and safety. While federal select agent legislation requires laboratories to have emergency plans in place with first responders, these plans do not necessarily include public health professionals, who will be responsible for any future public health action, such as quarantine, surveillance, or mass vaccinations, in the unlikely event that a laboratory-acquired infection spreads into a community. Laboratory-acquired infections do occur, even with the best safety mechanisms in place; however, the epidemiology of the incidence and severity of these infections are not known since there is no national surveillance reporting system. Evidence suggests that many of these infections occur in the absence of an actual laboratory accident. The best emergency plans and surveillance systems are only as good as the participation and vigilance of the laboratory workers themselves. Thus, laboratory workers have a responsibility to themselves and others to report all laboratory accidents and spills, regardless how minor. In addition, they should have a lower threshold than normal in seeking medical attention when feeling ill, and their physicians should be aware of what pathogens they work with to reduce the risk of a delay in diagnosis.

Graham, TW; Sabelnikov, AG

Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management [J. Homeland Secur. Emergency Manage.]. Vol. 1, no. 3, [vp]. 2004.

Winning the war against terrorism will require adoption of new strategies for decision-making, communication, and research and development. This is particularly true with respect to real-time detection and identification (DI) of Biological Weapons (BW). Real-time bio-sensors presently used by the military do not satisfy the requirements for a civilian environment. More sophisticated BW sensors are needed with false positives and false negatives minimized and addressed. Expert first responders and health professionals in a few cities are becoming familiar with Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based sensors, but are mostly unaware of other real-time BW DI possibilities in the R&D pipeline. The aim of this paper is to provide individuals outside of the BW research community with an overview of the current status and future prospects for real-time BW detection and identification. It is expected that the Dept. of Homeland Security will play an essential role in establishing incentive systems so that the most appropriate research is conducted and evaluated with peer review using both scientists and first responders. This type of overall strategy has the potential to finally produce real-time biosensors with required properties and keep our BW preparedness ahead of our terrorist enemies' emerging capabilities.

Milliman, J; Grosskopf, J; Paez, O; Ayen, W

Environmental Quality Management [Environ. Qual. Manage.]. Vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1-15. 2004.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government and private industry suddenly found themselves much more intricately involved than ever before in efforts to respond to and contain terrorism. This national emphasis is already contributing to the development of new laws, regulations, and mandates from state and federal legislatures and regulatory agencies. One example is the U.S. Department of Transportation's mandated security awareness training for carriers of hazardous materials. Mandates such as these will only add to the existing burden faced by environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) professionals and their organizations, at a time when their resources have shrunk under the strains of budget cuts and a slow economy.

Sundelius, B; Groenvall, J

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 17-24. 2004.

Systems for societal/homeland security in both Europe and the United States are in flux to adjust to 21st century threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime. It is important that reforms take place on both sides of the Atlantic that recognize the interdependence of Europe and the United States. Security, including biosecurity, for Europe is strongly connected to security in the U.S. Diseases transcend borders, and their consequences can be the same, irrespective of where the outbreak occurs or whether it is a natural occurrence or an act of bioterrorism. This article examines the political and strategic dilemmas and complexities that would confront the European Union (EU) in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a naturally occurring outbreak. Although several initiatives have been taken by the 15 member states and within the EU Commission, the EU is not institutionally prepared for transnational, rapidly moving diseases that could cause grave consequences in Europe and other regions, including the U.S. The prime responsibility for protecting European citizens against outbreaks rests with each member state. However, with intertwined and open European societies, the consequences would likely spill across borders. The EU Commission would have to become involved because such aspects as the internal market and freedom of movement would be affected. Responsibility, but not authority, would be pushed to the top. A coordinated EU response to such crises depends on European political leadership.

Becker, SM

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 195-207. 2004.

With the threat posed by terrorism involving radioactive materials now high on the nation's agenda, local, state, and federal agencies are moving to enhance preparedness and response capabilities. Crucial to these efforts is the development of effective risk communication strategies. This article reports findings from an ongoing study of risk communication issues in nuclear/radiological terrorism situations. It is part of a larger CDC-funded effort that aims to better understand communication challenges associated with weapons of mass destruction terrorism incidents. Presented here are formative research findings from 16 focus groups (n = 163) in which a multi-part, hypothetical radioactive materials terrorism situation was discussed. Twelve of the focus groups were carried out with members of the general public (drawn from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and geographic locations), and four groups were composed of first responders, hospital emergency department personnel, and public health professionals. One aim of the focus groups was to elicit detailed information on people's knowledge, views, perceptions, reactions, and concerns related to a nuclear/radiological terrorism event, and to better understand people's specific information needs and preferred information sources. A second aim was to pretest draft informational materials prepared by CDC and NIOSH. Key findings for the public and professional groups are presented, and the implications of the research for developing messages in radiological/nuclear terrorism situations are explored.

Lesperance, A; Judd, K; Peterson, N

2003 Georgia Basin/Puget Sound Resarch Conference Proceedings. [np]. Feb 2004.

Security is a growing concern worldwide, and homeland security has captured the attention of the United States over the past year and a half. In addition, awareness of the concept of environmental security--the notion that environmental degradation may have security implications--has been growing over the past decade. Internationally, environmental issues have direct links to security, as evidenced by the Middle East water disputes. While environmental security has not historically been a topic of major concern within the national boundaries of the United States or Canada, the environmental and development challenges that we're facing in the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin (PS/GB), coupled with this growing concern for security, prompted a query to consider whether environmental or natural resource problems could pose a serious threat to regional cooperation or stability in the PS/GB and, hence, deserve more attention from regional decision-makers. This discussion is expected to provide a useful focus for future collaboration and integration in the PS/GB.

Kemp, Roger L.

Public Works Management & Policy, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 187-189, January 2005

This article examines state-of-the-art practices in the evolving field of homeland security. The increased level of intergovernmental cooperation is documented between all levels of governmentacities, counties, and state, as well as the federal government. All of these levels of government are now cooperating to safeguard America to avert another terrorism incident such as the one that occurred on 9/11/01. The various levels of government are now cooperating with other special district and nonprofit organizations. Special districts include transit, water, and sewer. Nonprofit organizations include hospitals, health clinics, and other medical facilities. As time passes, the author predicts that the level of cooperation between public and nonprofit agencies will increase in the area of homeland security. Both sectors will be working together to safeguard America.

Rosendorff, B. Peter; Sandler, Todd

Journal Of Conflict Resolution, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 657-671, October 2004

In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of eventanormal or spectacular. Unlike previous analyses, proactive policy has a downside by increasing grievances and, consequently, terrorist recruitment. If the government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by providing a larger constituency. Aggressive antiterrorist actions, encouraged by a high perceived loss from terrorism and low marginal proactive costs, may result in spectacular events with dire consequences. If spectaculars are transferred abroad to soft targets, then proactive operations may be excessive from a global viewpoint as external costs are ignored. The analysis explains why some target nations engage in a modest level of offense but a prime target chooses a large level.

Morozov, Viatcheslav

Cooperation And Conflict, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 317-331, September 2004

Relations between Russia and the Baltic States a the weakest link in the Baltic Rim a have significantly improved since 2000. One of the explanations for this improvement is the fact that in contemporary Russian political discourse national identity is desecuritized. The role of the Baltic states has radically changed: they are no longer considered as an embodiment of the afalsea anti-Russian Europe. However, despite the desecuritization of national identity, security as the model of structuring and governing the aexternala world still dominates political discourse. The preponderance of the war against terrorism as discursive articulation, as well as the modernist nature of President Putinas political project, leads to the marginalization of the Baltic Sea area on the political agenda. Some new departures in Russiaas policy as regards the Baltic Sea area are possible, however, once Russia has gone through its election campaign, and the enlargements of NATO and the EU are complete.

Newcomer, Kathryn; Grob, George

American Review Of Public Administration, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 235-251, September 2004

Rapid change in responsibilities, requirements, and human resource demands has been the constant for federal Offices of the Inspector General over the past decade. They have been drawn into work on the management challenges facing their agencies, new requirements levied by the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Government Performance and Results Act, and crisis management efforts imposed by recent homeland security threats. This study replicates previous surveys of the Office of the Inspector General community undertaken in 1992 and 1996 to assess how it is meeting current challenges and has changed in its roles and responsibilities over the past decade. The study found the Inspector General community evolving and stretching to meet newdemands while retaining core functions. It is expanding its repertoire of analytical services, working closely with agency management to address management challenges, and confronting new human capital needs, especially in the field of information technology.

Weiss, Thomas G.

Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 135-153, June 2004

In spite of the current preoccupations, in the United States and in the United Nations, with the wars on terrorism and the occupation in Iraq, humanitarian intervention remains an important policy option. Future debates and action are framed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose report entitled The Responsibility To Protect and an accompanying research volume were published in December 2001. Future humanitarian crises will arise in conjunction with the need for military force to protect human beings, and so four shortcomings of the report are evident. First, the report is not as forward-looking as the commissioners thought or as many opponents feared. Second, the concerns of the most vehement critics, especially developing countries, are misplaced because the problem is too little humanitarian intervention, not too much. Third, the purported danger that the concept of the responsibility to protect might become a Trojan Horse to be used by the great powers to intervene is fundamentally incorrect; rather, intervention by the USA in its pre-emptive or preventive war mode is the pressing concern. Fourth, the notion of reforming the UN Security Council is an illusion; the real challenge is to identify those humanitarian crises where Washingtonas tactical multilateralism kicks in.

Li, Quan; Schaub, Drew

Journal Of Conflict Resolution, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 230-258, April 2004

The effect of economic globalization on the number of transnational terrorist incidents within countries is analyzed statistically, using a sample of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997. Results show that trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio investment have no direct positive effect on transnational terrorist incidents within countries and that economic developments of a country and its top trading partners reduce the number of terrorist incidents inside the country. To the extent that trade and FDI promote economic development, they have an indirect negative effect on transnational terrorism.

Kemp, Roger

Public Works Management & Policy, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 271-277, April 2004

This article on homeland security documents trends in America in this field since September 11, 2001. It highlights positive trends in U.S. counties and cities in this new and evolving discipline. These best practices are categorized under the four phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Trends for the future of homeland security are also discussed. This article clearly documents that local governments are at the forefront of this new national movement.

Kay, Sean

Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 9-25, March 2004

This article surveys major international relations theory as a framework for thinking about globalization; examines the modern role of power within a globalized international system; and illustrates these dynamics within the context of international terrorism. The central conclusion is that globalization has not radically changed fundamental aspects of international relations, but has rather altered means and channels for the exercise of power. The article demonstrates that power remains the key independent variable shaping modern international relations. Globalization is a manifestation of new means through which power is exercised and distributed. Nevertheless, the complexity of globalization requires a reassessment of the meaning of power in international security.

Brzoska, Michael

Journal Of Peace Research, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 107-117, January 2004

The past few years have seen the development in Germany of a discourse on the phenomenon of anew warsa. This debate on the nature and cause of new wars is linked to changes in German military policy in the 1990s as well as to growing criticism of globalization. In particular, this review discusses as examples two books that have found wide audiences. In contrast to much of current Anglo-Saxon mainstream research on internal conflicts, emphasis in Germany is placed on the effects of globalization as a major factor in the causation of new wars. Globalization speeds up the decay of states and provides rebels with opportunities they previously did not have. In addition, new wars are characterized by asymmetry in warfare. Therefore, with the growing availability of small arms and light weapons, these wars have grown in number. The authors of the books under review have preferred to adopt a holistic approach to examining collective violence, which allows for the integration into their analysis, in addition to warfare, of a good number of contemporary phenomena, including terrorism and globalization. However, there are methodological shortcomings. In particular, general propositions are often made on the basis of reports from selected cases, without recourse to quantitative evidence.

Altman, Dennis

International Relations, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 417-427, December 2003

The war on terrorism has drawn attention to non-conventional threats to security, even as it led to conventional warfare in the case of the attack on Iraq. HIV/AIDS is arguably an even greater threat to security, with the effect of destabilizing the social and economic order to the extent that the very survival of entire nations is at stake. This article examines both the security implications of AIDS, and the various international responses aimed at slowing its spread and mitigating its impact.

Van Ham, Peter

Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 427-444, December 2003

This article argues that the United States is not only fighting a war against international terrorism by classical, military means, but is also engaged in a battle over the ahearts and mindsa of the Muslim world. It examines the USAas public diplomacy efforts to manage the after-shocks of 9/11, and identifies the key concepts that underlie public diplomacy. The article presents a brief overview of the main points of criticism that these policies have provoked. It concludes that although the USAas public diplomacy is an essential (and still underdeveloped and undervalued) component of its overall policy towards the Middle East, it will take more than better communications to address the USAas credibility and image problems in that region.

Rynning, Sten

Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 479-496, December 2003

The vigorous debate addressing the potential of the European Unionas security and defence policy is indicative of high hopes and severe policy problems. This article examines the likelihood that EU member-states will develop the strategic culture - reflecting common interests and views of the world - that can be said to be a precondition for a successful security and defence policy. The article first investigates the EUas predominant values and the reigning conception of the legitimate use of military force, and it then weighs this political potential of the security and defence policy against obstacles to unity: the apost-moderna complexity of multilevel governance coupled with the necessity of amoderna executive authority to undertake military coercion, as illustrated by the recent fight against global terrorism. In the light of the conclusion that the EU does not have the potential to construct a strong strategic culture, the article suggests steps the EU could take to safeguard liberal achievements in its history of integration while also enabling strategic military action by groups of countries sharing a particular view of the world, an interest in a particular conflict, or both.

Drakos, Konstantinos; Kutan, Ali M.

Journal Of Conflict Resolution, vol. 47, no. 5, pp. 621-641, October 2003

A consumer-choice theoretical model is developed to test the regional effects of terrorism on competitors' market shares in the tourism sector where involved countries enjoy significant tourism activities but are subject to a high frequency of terrorist attacks. Using data for three Mediterranean countriesaGreece, Israel, and Turkeyafor the period from January 1991 to December 2000, results show significant own and spillover effects of terrorism on market shares. Terrorist incidents are decomposed to better identify the impacts of terrorism on tourism. Significant contagion effects of terrorism on market shares in the region are documented, as is evidence of the effect of terrorism on the substitutability between countries.