Smoke-Control Systems and Homeland Security
Heating/Piping/Air Conditioning Engineering. Vol. 76, no. 7,
pp. 31-39. July 2004
A building's existing damper system can offer much
in terms of protection in the event of an airborne chemical, biological, or
radiological attack-or an accident that releases harmful airborne
contaminants to the indoor environment. Control strategies, which involve
the use of air-handling units and fire and smoke systems, are described in
this article. Additionally, advice specific to hospital environments is
Emerging Technologies For Homeland Security.
Communications of the ACM. Vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 32-35. Mar.
The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, dramatically
demonstrated the reach and effects of terrorism and made protecting the
security of citizens a top priority and a major challenge for many
governments worldwide. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security
is an exemplar response by the U.S. to such a challenge, drawing upon the
intellectual and technological capabilities of scholars, scientists, and
technologists. In this special section, we highlight some of the key
emerging technologies related to several critical areas in the realm of
Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated
December 5, 2003. CRS Report for Congress
Performer: Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
5 Dec 2003. 30p. Report: RL-31733
This report provides background
information and discusses potential issues for Congress on the topic of
port security, which has emerged as a significant part of the overall
debate on U.S. homeland security. The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability to terrorist attack of
U.S. ports and the ships in them. The issue for Congress is providing
oversight on port security and proposals for improving it. Port security
legislation can have significant implications for public safety, the war on
terrorism, the U.S. and global economy, and federal, state, and local
homeland security responsibilities and expenditures.
Intelligence Support To Maritime Homeland Security
Performer: Naval War Coll., Newport, RI. Joint Military
Operations Dept. 16 May 2003. 33p.
Intelligence is critical to resolving
the competing interests of security and prosperity and is the basis for a
risk management approach to security. This essay looks at intelligence and
how it is or might be employed to help minimize the risk of a maritime
terrorism and how the resources of the intelligence community contribute to
reducing the force to space ratio. Integration of law enforcement and
intelligence is fundamental to the success of homeland security. Terrorism
does not recognize borders, but the U.S. division of responsibilities has
created a seam in our defenses. Some aspects of globalization have resulted
in blurring of traditional intelligence and law enforcement roles, but some
additional fundamental changes are required. The Navy/Coast Guard
counter-narcotics mission demonstrates a practical solution to joint
military-law enforcement operations. The USA Patriot Act has facilitated
greater sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information. Command
and control plays an important part in properly using intelligence. The new
Terrorist Threat Integration Center has been created at the strategic
level; the Joint Interagency Task Force provides an excellent framework at
the operational and tactical level. The Coast Guard has developed the
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) concept to reconcile security and
prosperity issues in the man time environment. MDA begins overseas. Foreign
intelligence operations, regional security cooperation, and leveraging
regional relationships are critical to the doctrine of pre-emption and
successful maritime homeland defense.
The NRC's Dirty Little Secret
HIRSCH, D; LOCHBAUM, D; LYMAN, E
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.
59, no. 3, pp. 45-51, May /June, 2003
After the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, it was widely thought that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) would adopt tighter security regulations for nuclear power
plants. This has not occurred. The design basis threat (DBT) guidelines
have long mandated minimal security efforts: Facilities should be able to
withstand attack by three individuals armed with automatic weapons, aided
by conspirators from within (a substantial menace). The guidelines do not
consider assaults carried out by larger teams, aircraft, or boats. Tests
conducted by the NRC, called Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations,
have raised alarms. At half of the potentially threatened sites, mock
assailants have been able to take over plants and simulate enough damage to
cause reactor meltdown, even with up to 6 months of advanced warning.
Despite obvious weaknesses, the nuclear industry and NRC have lobbied
Congress to prevent higher defensive standards. The belief is that spending
money on these measures might make expansion of nuclear reactors more
difficult. Although the NRC continues to study possible effects of a
terrorist airline attack on plants or spent fuel pools, no specific goals
have been announced. The NRC refuses to impose no-fly zones over these
facilities or to ask for antiaircraft systems. It continues to insist the
plants are hardened to the point where no conceivable attack would release
radiation. Another problem is the manpower issue. Security personnel at
nuclear plants are being pushed to their limits by excessive overtime
demands. They are often poorly trained and paid and consequently suffer
from low morale. The new Office of Homeland Security, the Defense
Department, and Congress must share the blame for any inaction. All calls
for closer scrutiny are being muffled in the name of national security.
Ultimately, the public must demand more disclosure and accountability from
Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure
Copeland, C; Cody, B
Performer: Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC. Resources, Science, and Industry Div. May 2003. 10p.
Damage to or destruction of the nation's water supply
and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack could disrupt the
delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health
and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such
problems has increased since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas,
and ownership and operation responsibility are both public and private but
are overwhelmingly nonfederal. Since the attacks, federal dam operators and
water and wastewater utilities have been under heightened security
conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. Policymakers are
considering a number of options, including enhanced physical security,
better communication and coordination, and research. A key issue is how
additional protections and resources directed at public and private sector
priorities will be funded. In response, Congress has approved $410 million
in funds for security at water infrastructure facilities and passed a bill
requiring drinking water utilities to conduct security vulnerability
assessments Congress also created a Department of Homeland Security with
responsibilities to coordinate information to secure the nation's critical
infrastructure, including the water sector. Continuing attention to these
issues in the 108th Congress is anticipated. Current interest is focusing
on bills concerning security of wastewater utilities. This report will be
updated as warranted.
Restructuring for Homeland Security - What is Really Necessary
Performer: Army War Coll., Carlisle Barracks, PA. 16 Mar
The challenges of improving homeland security in the wake of
the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and subsequent events, such
as the anthrax outbreak and sniper shootings, have revealed numerous
deficiencies of governmental functioning in the prevention and response to
terrorist attacks, as well as operational adaptation by response agencies
and officials at all levels of government. The defense of this nation and
the war on terrorism ultimately involves every agency and level of
government. We can anticipate numerous changes in the intergovernmental
system and interorganizational structure. This strategic research paper
analyzes the post-September 11 challenges faced by the U.S. national
security apparatus and the new threat environment, homeland security and
strategy, and recommends the decision-making structure that fits best.
West Publishing to cover legal aspects of anti-terror work by homeland
director Tom Ridge and George W. Bush
Information World Review; (188) Feb 2003, p.2
The coverage of
Thomson's West Publishing legal databases has been extended to include US
homeland security and anti-terrorism. Westlaw's Homeland Security and
Anti-Terrorism resources will draw on a wide range of legal areas,
including immigration and border security, criminal law and procedure,
civil rights, government contracts, administrative law, privacy and the
Freedom of Information Act, labour/employment, civil service law, insurance
and military law. (Quotes from original text)
Securing through technology? "Smart borders" after September 11th
Knowledge, Technology, and Policy; 16 (1) Spring 2003,
This paper offers preliminary cross-disciplinary research into
the technological and policy dimensions of the U.S. border security regime
in the post-September 11th era. Complex advances in security and
surveillance technologies - comprising so-called "Smart Borders" - have
emerged as preferred policy solutions to the difficult problem of screening
for terrorist incursions into the United States through air and landborders
while maintaining flows of goods and individuals under globalization.
Beginning with an analysis of the defined threats and solutions to border
security, the paper moves to discuss three new technologically-oriented
control systems: surveillance, biometrics, and information technology.
Their development is analyzed through a policy framework which relies on
the concept of a "focusing event", crises like the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. In so doing, it probes the important nexus between
post-crisis public policy formation, values, and technological development.
It then evaluates the prospects for effectiveimplementation of these
measures within the context of border politics, the pressures of
globalization, and an open democratic society. (Original abstract)
Terrorism - A New Age of War: Is The United States Up To The
Performer: Army War Coll., Carlisle Barracks, PA. 9 Apr 2002.
The U.S. is being drawn ever deeper into the war on terrorism.
Terrorism is predicted to be the primary threat to the U.S. for the
foreseeable future. The recent attacks on the U.S. homeland, the USS Cole
bombing, and the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa indicate that the stakes
are getting higher and higher. The war in Afghanistan demonstrates to the
world our resolve in winning the war. But this is only a first step. The
war on terrorism will likely be long term and will not be won easily. This
is a new kind of war. It will not only be fought on a traditional
battlefield with traditional opponents with traditional weapons. It will
also be fought on Main Street America and in cyberspace and it will be
fought against opponents we can't see or even envision. It will be won with
technology, some of which is yet to be developed. But this war will only be
as effective as the policies guiding it. The instruments of power must be
wielded in new and different ways to achieve our goals. Significant changes
in policies and strategies are required to effectively utilize and
synergize all the instruments of power. This paper will evaluate current
and evolving policies and trends with respect to counterterrorism.
Comprehensive Reference Resource for September 11, 2001
Performer: National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC. 2002. 2 CD-ROMs.
Comprehensive Reference Resource (CRR) is designed to provide a reference
resource for our nation's leadership, emergency responders, and supporting
practitioners to learn what happened on September 11, 2001 and how they can
better prepare their communities for the threat and consequences of
Terrorism in the United States 1997
Performer: Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Jan 1997. 29p.
edition of Terrorism in the United State chronicles significant
terrorism-related events occurring within the United States during 1997, It
also includes articles that span the broad range of issues related to the
terrorist threat facing the United States. These articles focus on the
growth of so-called Common Law Courts, the designation of 30 foreign
terrorist organizations pursuant to provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the technique of rendering
terrorists from abroad. Focus articles also discuss the dangers posed by
secondary explosive devices targeting first responders and the impact of
hoaxes involving weapons of mass destruction. In addition, this report
provides statistical data relating to terrorism within the United States.
This material has been drawn from FBI records to provide a historical
framework for the discussion of terrorism presented in this report.
Preliminary Results from the World Trade Center Evacuation Study -- New
York City, 2003
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report [Morb. Mortal. Weekly Rep.]. Vol.
53, no. 35, pp. 815-817. 10 Sep 2004.
On September 11, 2001, an estimated
13,000--15,000 persons successfully evacuated the two World Trade Center
(WTC) towers. Because full-scale evacuations of such buildings are rare,
little is known about how readily and rapidly these buildings can be
evacuated and what factors serve as facilitators or barriers to the
process. In 2002, the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia
University and CDC initiated The World Trade Center Evacuation Study, a
multiyear qualitative and quantitative research study designed to assess
factors that affected evacuation of the two WTC towers. This report
summarizes qualitative data collected from Phase I of the study, which
suggested that improved preparedness at the individual, organizational, and
building environmental levels can facilitate rapid evacuation. Completion
of Phase II of the study, together with other research efforts, should help
workers, management, and local authorities develop and evaluate model
emergency preparedness programs for high-rise occupancies.
Terrorism-Preparedness Training for Non-Clinical Hospital Workers:
Tailoring Content and Presentation to Meet Workers' Needs
Thorne, CD; Oliver, M; Al-Ibrahim, M; Gucer, PW; McDiarmid, MA
Occupational and Environmental Medicine [J. Occup. Environ. Med.]. Vol. 46,
no. 7, pp. 668-676. Jul 2004.
Clinicians have been the primary focus of
health care worker training in response to the 2001 terrorist and anthrax
attacks. However, many nonclinical hospital workers also are critical in
providing medical care during any large-scale emergency. We designed a
training program, guided by focus groups, to provide them with information
to recognize unusual events and to protect themselves. We compared four
different training methods: workbook, video, lecture, and a small-group
discussion. One hundred and ninety-one workers participated. After the
training, they were more confident in their employer's preparedness to
respond to a terrorist attack but specific knowledge did not change
substantially. Fortunately, the self-directed workbook (the more economical
and least disruptive method) was as effective as the other methods. Our
experience may be useful to others who are planning terrorism-preparedness
Quantitation of Biomarkers of Exposure to Nitrogen Mustards in Urine
from Rats Dosed with Nitrogen Mustards and from an Unexposed Human
Lemire, SW; Barr, JR; Ashley, DL; Olson, CT; Hayes, TL
Analytical Toxicology [J. Anal. Toxicol.]. Vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 320-326.
The nitrogen mustards bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (HN1),
bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (HN2), and tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (HN3)
have the potential to be used as chemical terrorism agents because of their
extreme vesicant properties. We modified a previously reported method to
incorporate automated solid-phase extraction, improve chromatography, and
include the urinary metabolite for HN3. The improved method was used to
measure levels of the urinary metabolites N-ethyldiethanolamine (EDEA),
N-methyldiethanolamine (MDEA), and triethanolamine (TEA) in rats dosed with
HN1, HN2, and HN3, respectively, and to establish background levels of
EDEA, MDEA, and TEA in human urine samples from a population with no known
exposure to nitrogen mustards. Rat dosing experiments confirmed that EDEA,
MDEA, and TEA could be detected in urine for at least 48 h after exposure
to HN1, HN2, and HN3, respectively. Substantial amounts of EDEA (89 ng/mL),
MDEA (170 ng/mL), and TEA (1105 ng/mL) were measured in the urine of rats
exposed to 10 mg HN1, HN2, and HN3, respectively, 48 h after exposure. The
background concentrations for TEA in the human population ranged from below
the limit of detection (LOD 3 ng/mL) to approximately 6500 ng/mL. Neither
EDEA (LOD 0.4 ng/mL) nor MDEA (LOD 0.8 ng/mL) was detected above the LOD in
the human samples.
Advances in analytical technologies for environmental protection and
Sadik, OA; Wanekaya, AK; Andreescu, S
Journal of Environmental Monitoring
[J. Environ. Monit.]. Vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 513-522. Jun 2004.
Due to the
increased threats of chemical and biological agents of injury by terrorist
organizations, a significant effort is underway to develop tools that can
be used to detect and effectively combat chemical and biochemical toxins.
In addition to the right mix of policies and training of medical personnel
on how to recognize symptoms of biochemical warfare agents, the major
success in combating terrorism still lies in the prevention, early
detection and the efficient and timely response using reliable analytical
technologies and powerful therapies for minimizing the effects in the event
of an attack. The public and regulatory agencies expect reliable
methodologies and devices for public security. Today's systems are too
bulky or slow to meet the "detect-to-warn" needs for first responders such
as soldiers and medical personnel. This paper presents the challenges in
monitoring technologies for warfare agents and other toxins. It provides an
overview of how advances in environmental analytical methodologies could be
adapted to design reliable sensors for public safety and environmental
surveillance. The paths to designing sensors that meet the needs of today's
measurement challenges are analyzed using examples of novel sensors,
autonomous cell-based toxicity monitoring, 'Lab-on-a-Chip' devices and
conventional environmental analytical techniques. Finally, in order to
ensure that the public and legal authorities are provided with quality data
to make informed decisions, guidelines are provided for assessing data
quality and quality assurance using the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (US-EPA) methodologies.
Protective Clothing Takes Lead in Homeland Protection
Compliance Magazine [Compliance Mag.]. Vol. 11, no. 5, p. 21.
It has been almost three years since the events of Sept. 11,
and the protective clothing industry and regulatory bodies have responded
with improved equipment, services and best practices guidelines.
Developments within the protective clothing industry have also allowed
manufacturers to offer services and product lines that serve the needs of
A Survey Assessment of the Level of Preparedness for Domestic Terrorism
and Mass Casualty Incidents among Eastern Association for the Surgery of
Ciraulo, DL; Frykberg, ER; Feliciano, DV; Knuth, TE; Richart, CM;
Westmoreland, CD; Williams, KA
Journal of Trauma [J. Trauma]. Vol. 56,
no. 5, pp. 1033-1041. May 2004.
Objective: The goal of this survey was to
establish a benchmark for trauma surgeons' level of operational
understanding of the command structure for a prehospital incident, a mass
casualty incident (MCI), and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The survey
was distributed before the World Trade Center destruction on September 11,
2001. Methods: The survey was developed by the authors and reviewed by a
statistician for clarity and performance. The survey was sent to the
membership of the 2000 Eastern Association for the Surgery of Trauma spring
mailing, with two subsequent mailings and a final sampling at the Eastern
Association for the Surgery of Trauma 2001 meeting. Of 723 surveys mailed,
243 were returned and statistically analyzed (significance indicated by p <
0.05). Results: No statistical difference existed between level of
designation of a trauma center (state or American College of Surgeons) and
a facility's level of preparedness for MCIs or WMD. Physicians in
communities with chemical plants, railways, and waterway traffic were
statistically more likely to work at facilities with internal disaster
plans addressing chemical and biological threats. Across all variables,
physicians with military training were significantly better prepared for
response to catastrophic events. With the exception of cyanide (50%), less
than 30% of the membership was prepared to manage exposure to a nerve
agent, less than 50% was prepared to manage illness from intentional
biological exposure, and only 73% understood and were prepared to manage
blast injury. Mobile medical response teams were present in 46% of the
respondents' facilities, but only 30% of those teams deployed a trauma
surgeon. Approximately 70% of the membership had been involved in an MCI,
although only 60% understood the command structure for a prehospital
incident. Only 33% of the membership had training regarding hazardous
materials. Of interest, 76% and 65%, respectively, felt that education
about MCIs and WMD should be included in residency training. Conclusion: A
facility's level of pre-paredness for MCIs or WMD was not related to level
of designation as a trauma center, but may be positively influenced by
local physicians with prior military background. Benchmark information from
this survey will provide the architecture for the development and
implementation of further training in these areas for trauma surgeons.
Establishing Remediation Levels in Response to a Radiological Dispersal
Event (or "Dirty Bomb")
Elcock, D; Klemic, GA; Taboas, AL
Environmental Science & Technology
[Environ. Sci. Technol.]. Vol. 38, no. 9, pp. 2505-2512. 1 May 2004.
detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could produce
significant social and economic damage, the extent of which would depend
largely on how quickly and effectively cleanup levels were established and
on public acceptance of those levels. This paper shows that current
radiological cleanup laws and regulations, models for converting dose or
risk goals to cleanup concentrations, and existing site-specific criteria
were not designed specifically for RDD cleanups but, absent changes, would
apply by default. The goals and approaches of these legal and
methodological structures often conflict; using them in response to
terrorism could undermine public confidence, cause delays, and produce
unnecessary costs or unacceptable cleanups. RDD cleanups would involve
immediate priorities not envisioned in the existing radiological cleanup
framework, such as balancing radiation risks with the health, economic, and
other societal impacts associated with access to the infrastructure
necessary to sustain society (e.g., hospitals, bridges, utilities). To
minimize the achievement of terrorism goals, the elements of an RDD cleanup
response - including updating existing legal/regulatory structures to
clarify federal authority, goals, and methods for developing RDD cleanup
criteria - must be in place soon; given the complexity of the issues and
the potential societal impact, this effort should be expedited.
Nutraceutical/drug/anti-terrorism safety assurance through
Toxicology Letters [Toxicol. Lett.]. Vol. 150, no. 1, pp.
25-27. Apr 2004.
Nutraceuticals are naturally occurring/derived bioactive
compounds that are reported to have health benefits. The delivery systems
for nutraceuticals are foods (functional foods), supplements, or both.
Drugs are designed to have medicinal properties for the prevention and
treatment of identified diseases or signs and symptoms of disease.
Counterfeit drugs contain either placebo, materials not identified in the
labeling or substandard or impure materials, which may produce untoward
pharmacological or toxicological effects. In addition, the consumer has the
right to microbiological safety and prevention from adverse exposure to
hazardous chemical(s), and other adverse compounds. Nutraceutical/drug
delivery systems are viewed as approaches to (1) enhanced consumer health,
(2) decreased healthcare costs, and (3) enhanced economic development.
Therefore, the nutra/pharma/ceutical industry is reliant upon a strong
underpinning of diversified research that addresses safety and assures
chemical and biological efficacy. Significant safety through traceability
can be assured by the coupling of the technologies of (a) global
positioning (GPS); (b) bar/chip coding; and (c) hazard analysis critical
control point (HACCP) management, coupled to rapid nanotechnology marker
assays now under development.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule and Bioterrorism Planning, Prevention, and
Hodge, JG Jr; Brown, EF; O'Connell, JP
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism
[Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 73-80. 2004.
bioterrorism planning, prevention, and response require information sharing
between various entities, ranging from public health authorities and
health-care workers to national security and law enforcement officials.
While the source of much information exchanged may be nonidentifiable, many
entities legitimately need access to personally identifiable health
information (or "protected health information" [PHI]) in planning for and
responding to a bioterrorism event. The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows for
essential exchanges of health data during a public health emergency while
protecting against unnecessary disclosures of PHI. In the event of a
bioterrorist attack, the Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose
PHI without individual authorization in the following instances: (1) for
treatment by health-care providers, (2) to avert a serious threat to health
or safety, (3) to public health authorities for public health purposes, (4)
to protect national security, (5) to law enforcement under certain
conditions, and (6) for judicial or administrative proceedings. Despite
these favorable disclosure provisions, some privacy challenges remain. The
flow of PHI may be slowed by misunderstandings of the Privacy Rule's
accounting requirement. In addition, in a bioterrorism scenario,
nontraditional entities may find themselves acting as health-care
providers, triggering Privacy Rule provisions. Finally, the potential for
de facto disclosures of individuals' disease or exposure status increases
where conspicuous treatment methods, isolation, or quarantine are
implemented without additional measures to protect privacy. Understanding
the Privacy Rule's impact on bioterrorism planning and response ensures
that various entities can conduct their activities with needed information
while still protecting individual privacy.
Biodefense Research: Can Secrecy and Safety Coexist?
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2,
no. 2, pp. 81-85. 2004.
Over the next 10 years, the United States will
spend $6 billion to develop countermeasures against biological and chemical
weapons. Much of this research on highly virulent pathogens will be done in
academic settings around the country. This article explores the challenges
in ensuring secrecy to protect national security while accommodating the
right of local communities to have access to safety information regarding
select agents and laboratory-acquired infections. Secrecy has been defended
as being vital for protecting national security. Problems with secrecy can
include the misinterpretation of intentions, particularly in laboratories
located in nuclear weapons design facilities, and the restricted access to
information relevant to public health and safety. While federal select
agent legislation requires laboratories to have emergency plans in place
with first responders, these plans do not necessarily include public health
professionals, who will be responsible for any future public health action,
such as quarantine, surveillance, or mass vaccinations, in the unlikely
event that a laboratory-acquired infection spreads into a community.
Laboratory-acquired infections do occur, even with the best safety
mechanisms in place; however, the epidemiology of the incidence and
severity of these infections are not known since there is no national
surveillance reporting system. Evidence suggests that many of these
infections occur in the absence of an actual laboratory accident. The best
emergency plans and surveillance systems are only as good as the
participation and vigilance of the laboratory workers themselves. Thus,
laboratory workers have a responsibility to themselves and others to report
all laboratory accidents and spills, regardless how minor. In addition,
they should have a lower threshold than normal in seeking medical attention
when feeling ill, and their physicians should be aware of what pathogens
they work with to reduce the risk of a delay in diagnosis.
How Much Is Enough: Real-Time Detection and Identification of Biological
Graham, TW; Sabelnikov, AG
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management [J. Homeland Secur. Emergency Manage.]. Vol. 1, no. 3, [vp].
Winning the war against terrorism will require adoption of new
strategies for decision-making, communication, and research and
development. This is particularly true with respect to real-time detection
and identification (DI) of Biological Weapons (BW). Real-time bio-sensors
presently used by the military do not satisfy the requirements for a
civilian environment. More sophisticated BW sensors are needed with false
positives and false negatives minimized and addressed. Expert first
responders and health professionals in a few cities are becoming familiar
with Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based sensors, but are mostly unaware
of other real-time BW DI possibilities in the R&D pipeline. The aim of this
paper is to provide individuals outside of the BW research community with
an overview of the current status and future prospects for real-time BW
detection and identification. It is expected that the Dept. of Homeland
Security will play an essential role in establishing incentive systems so
that the most appropriate research is conducted and evaluated with peer
review using both scientists and first responders. This type of overall
strategy has the potential to finally produce real-time biosensors with
required properties and keep our BW preparedness ahead of our terrorist
enemies' emerging capabilities.
Responding to New Security and Environmental Threats: An Integrated
Security, Environment, Health, and Safety (SEH&S) Management System
Milliman, J; Grosskopf, J; Paez, O; Ayen, W
Management [Environ. Qual. Manage.]. Vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1-15. 2004.
the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government
and private industry suddenly found themselves much more intricately
involved than ever before in efforts to respond to and contain terrorism.
This national emphasis is already contributing to the development of new
laws, regulations, and mandates from state and federal legislatures and
regulatory agencies. One example is the U.S. Department of Transportation's
mandated security awareness training for carriers of hazardous materials.
Mandates such as these will only add to the existing burden faced by
environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) professionals and their
organizations, at a time when their resources have shrunk under the strains
of budget cuts and a slow economy.
Strategic Dilemmas of Biosecurity in the European Union
Sundelius, B; Groenvall, J
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur.
Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 17-24. 2004.
societal/homeland security in both Europe and the United States are in flux
to adjust to 21st century threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and
organized crime. It is important that reforms take place on both sides of
the Atlantic that recognize the interdependence of Europe and the United
States. Security, including biosecurity, for Europe is strongly connected
to security in the U.S. Diseases transcend borders, and their consequences
can be the same, irrespective of where the outbreak occurs or whether it is
a natural occurrence or an act of bioterrorism. This article examines the
political and strategic dilemmas and complexities that would confront the
European Union (EU) in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a naturally
occurring outbreak. Although several initiatives have been taken by the 15
member states and within the EU Commission, the EU is not institutionally
prepared for transnational, rapidly moving diseases that could cause grave
consequences in Europe and other regions, including the U.S. The prime
responsibility for protecting European citizens against outbreaks rests
with each member state. However, with intertwined and open European
societies, the consequences would likely spill across borders. The EU
Commission would have to become involved because such aspects as the
internal market and freedom of movement would be affected. Responsibility,
but not authority, would be pushed to the top. A coordinated EU response to
such crises depends on European political leadership.
Emergency Communication and Information Issues in Terrorist Events
Involving Radioactive Materials
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism [Biosecur. Bioterrorism]. Vol. 2,
no. 3, pp. 195-207. 2004.
With the threat posed by terrorism involving
radioactive materials now high on the nation's agenda, local, state, and
federal agencies are moving to enhance preparedness and response
capabilities. Crucial to these efforts is the development of effective risk
communication strategies. This article reports findings from an ongoing
study of risk communication issues in nuclear/radiological terrorism
situations. It is part of a larger CDC-funded effort that aims to better
understand communication challenges associated with weapons of mass
destruction terrorism incidents. Presented here are formative research
findings from 16 focus groups (n = 163) in which a multi-part, hypothetical
radioactive materials terrorism situation was discussed. Twelve of the
focus groups were carried out with members of the general public (drawn
from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and geographic locations), and four
groups were composed of first responders, hospital emergency department
personnel, and public health professionals. One aim of the focus groups was
to elicit detailed information on people's knowledge, views, perceptions,
reactions, and concerns related to a nuclear/radiological terrorism event,
and to better understand people's specific information needs and preferred
information sources. A second aim was to pretest draft informational
materials prepared by CDC and NIOSH. Key findings for the public and
professional groups are presented, and the implications of the research for
developing messages in radiological/nuclear terrorism situations are
International Cooperation on Environmental Issues in the Puget
Sound/Georgia Basin: What Environmental Issues Could Threaten Regional
Lesperance, A; Judd, K; Peterson, N
2003 Georgia Basin/Puget Sound
Resarch Conference Proceedings. [np]. Feb 2004.
Security is a growing
concern worldwide, and homeland security has captured the attention of the
United States over the past year and a half. In addition, awareness of the
concept of environmental security--the notion that environmental
degradation may have security implications--has been growing over the past
decade. Internationally, environmental issues have direct links to
security, as evidenced by the Middle East water disputes. While
environmental security has not historically been a topic of major concern
within the national boundaries of the United States or Canada, the
environmental and development challenges that we're facing in the Puget
Sound/Georgia Basin (PS/GB), coupled with this growing concern for
security, prompted a query to consider whether environmental or natural
resource problems could pose a serious threat to regional cooperation or
stability in the PS/GB and, hence, deserve more attention from regional
decision-makers. This discussion is expected to provide a useful focus for
future collaboration and integration in the PS/GB.
Homeland Security: Working Together to Safeguard America
Kemp, Roger L.
Public Works Management & Policy, vol. 9, no. 3, pp.
187-189, January 2005
This article examines state-of-the-art practices in
the evolving field of homeland security. The increased level of
intergovernmental cooperation is documented between all levels of
governmentacities, counties, and state, as well as the federal government.
All of these levels of government are now cooperating to safeguard America
to avert another terrorism incident such as the one that occurred on
9/11/01. The various levels of government are now cooperating with other
special district and nonprofit organizations. Special districts include
transit, water, and sewer. Nonprofit organizations include hospitals,
health clinics, and other medical facilities. As time passes, the author
predicts that the level of cooperation between public and nonprofit
agencies will increase in the area of homeland security. Both sectors will
be working together to safeguard America.
Too Much of a Good Thing?: The Proactive Response Dilemma
Rosendorff, B. Peter; Sandler, Todd
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, vol.
48, no. 5, pp. 657-671, October 2004
In a two-player proactive response
game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is
endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken
the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of eventanormal or
spectacular. Unlike previous analyses, proactive policy has a downside by
increasing grievances and, consequently, terrorist recruitment. If the
government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by
providing a larger constituency. Aggressive antiterrorist actions,
encouraged by a high perceived loss from terrorism and low marginal
proactive costs, may result in spectacular events with dire consequences.
If spectaculars are transferred abroad to soft targets, then proactive
operations may be excessive from a global viewpoint as external costs are
ignored. The analysis explains why some target nations engage in a modest
level of offense but a prime target chooses a large level.
Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Desecuritization or
Cooperation And Conflict, vol. 39, no. 3, pp.
317-331, September 2004
Relations between Russia and the Baltic States a
the weakest link in the Baltic Rim a have significantly improved since
2000. One of the explanations for this improvement is the fact that in
contemporary Russian political discourse national identity is
desecuritized. The role of the Baltic states has radically changed: they
are no longer considered as an embodiment of the afalsea anti-Russian
Europe. However, despite the desecuritization of national identity,
security as the model of structuring and governing the aexternala world
still dominates political discourse. The preponderance of the war against
terrorism as discursive articulation, as well as the modernist nature of
President Putinas political project, leads to the marginalization of the
Baltic Sea area on the political agenda. Some new departures in Russiaas
policy as regards the Baltic Sea area are possible, however, once Russia
has gone through its election campaign, and the enlargements of NATO and
the EU are complete.
Federal Offices of the Inspector General: Thriving on Chaos?
Newcomer, Kathryn; Grob, George
American Review Of Public Administration,
vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 235-251, September 2004
Rapid change in
responsibilities, requirements, and human resource demands has been the
constant for federal Offices of the Inspector General over the past decade.
They have been drawn into work on the management challenges facing their
agencies, new requirements levied by the Chief Financial Officers Act and
the Government Performance and Results Act, and crisis management efforts
imposed by recent homeland security threats. This study replicates previous
surveys of the Office of the Inspector General community undertaken in 1992
and 1996 to assess how it is meeting current challenges and has changed in
its roles and responsibilities over the past decade. The study found the
Inspector General community evolving and stretching to meet newdemands
while retaining core functions. It is expanding its repertoire of
analytical services, working closely with agency management to address
management challenges, and confronting new human capital needs, especially
in the field of information technology.
The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect
in a Unipolar Era
Weiss, Thomas G.
Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 135-153, June
In spite of the current preoccupations, in the United States and in
the United Nations, with the wars on terrorism and the occupation in Iraq,
humanitarian intervention remains an important policy option. Future
debates and action are framed by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose report entitled The
Responsibility To Protect and an accompanying research volume were
published in December 2001. Future humanitarian crises will arise in
conjunction with the need for military force to protect human beings, and
so four shortcomings of the report are evident. First, the report is not as
forward-looking as the commissioners thought or as many opponents feared.
Second, the concerns of the most vehement critics, especially developing
countries, are misplaced because the problem is too little humanitarian
intervention, not too much. Third, the purported danger that the concept of
the responsibility to protect might become a Trojan Horse to be used by the
great powers to intervene is fundamentally incorrect; rather, intervention
by the USA in its pre-emptive or preventive war mode is the pressing
concern. Fourth, the notion of reforming the UN Security Council is an
illusion; the real challenge is to identify those humanitarian crises where
Washingtonas tactical multilateralism kicks in.
Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series
Li, Quan; Schaub, Drew
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, vol. 48, no. 2,
pp. 230-258, April 2004
The effect of economic globalization on the
number of transnational terrorist incidents within countries is analyzed
statistically, using a sample of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997. Results
show that trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio investment
have no direct positive effect on transnational terrorist incidents within
countries and that economic developments of a country and its top trading
partners reduce the number of terrorist incidents inside the country. To
the extent that trade and FDI promote economic development, they have an
indirect negative effect on transnational terrorism.
Homeland Security: Best Practices in America
Public Works Management & Policy, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 271-277,
This article on homeland security documents trends in America
in this field since September 11, 2001. It highlights positive trends in
U.S. counties and cities in this new and evolving discipline. These best
practices are categorized under the four phases of emergency management:
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Trends for the future of
homeland security are also discussed. This article clearly documents that
local governments are at the forefront of this new national movement.
Globalization, Power, and Security
Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 9-25, March 2004
article surveys major international relations theory as a framework for
thinking about globalization; examines the modern role of power within a
globalized international system; and illustrates these dynamics within the
context of international terrorism. The central conclusion is that
globalization has not radically changed fundamental aspects of
international relations, but has rather altered means and channels for the
exercise of power. The article demonstrates that power remains the key
independent variable shaping modern international relations. Globalization
is a manifestation of new means through which power is exercised and
distributed. Nevertheless, the complexity of globalization requires a
reassessment of the meaning of power in international security.
- a New Warsa Discourse in Germany
Journal Of Peace Research, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 107-117,
The past few years have seen the development in Germany of a
discourse on the phenomenon of anew warsa. This debate on the nature and
cause of new wars is linked to changes in German military policy in the
1990s as well as to growing criticism of globalization. In particular, this
review discusses as examples two books that have found wide audiences. In
contrast to much of current Anglo-Saxon mainstream research on internal
conflicts, emphasis in Germany is placed on the effects of globalization as
a major factor in the causation of new wars. Globalization speeds up the
decay of states and provides rebels with opportunities they previously did
not have. In addition, new wars are characterized by asymmetry in warfare.
Therefore, with the growing availability of small arms and light weapons,
these wars have grown in number. The authors of the books under review have
preferred to adopt a holistic approach to examining collective violence,
which allows for the integration into their analysis, in addition to
warfare, of a good number of contemporary phenomena, including terrorism
and globalization. However, there are methodological shortcomings. In
particular, general propositions are often made on the basis of reports
from selected cases, without recourse to quantitative evidence.
AIDS and Security
International Relations, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 417-427,
The war on terrorism has drawn attention to
non-conventional threats to security, even as it led to conventional
warfare in the case of the attack on Iraq. HIV/AIDS is arguably an even
greater threat to security, with the effect of destabilizing the social and
economic order to the extent that the very survival of entire nations is at
stake. This article examines both the security implications of AIDS, and
the various international responses aimed at slowing its spread and
mitigating its impact.
War, Lies, and Videotape: Public Diplomacy and the USAas War on
Van Ham, Peter
Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 427-444, December
This article argues that the United States is not only fighting a
war against international terrorism by classical, military means, but is
also engaged in a battle over the ahearts and mindsa of the Muslim world.
It examines the USAas public diplomacy efforts to manage the after-shocks
of 9/11, and identifies the key concepts that underlie public diplomacy.
The article presents a brief overview of the main points of criticism that
these policies have provoked. It concludes that although the USAas public
diplomacy is an essential (and still underdeveloped and undervalued)
component of its overall policy towards the Middle East, it will take more
than better communications to address the USAas credibility and image
problems in that region.
The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?
Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 479-496, December
The vigorous debate addressing the potential of the European Unionas
security and defence policy is indicative of high hopes and severe policy
problems. This article examines the likelihood that EU member-states will
develop the strategic culture - reflecting common interests and views of
the world - that can be said to be a precondition for a successful security
and defence policy. The article first investigates the EUas predominant
values and the reigning conception of the legitimate use of military force,
and it then weighs this political potential of the security and defence
policy against obstacles to unity: the apost-moderna complexity of
multilevel governance coupled with the necessity of amoderna executive
authority to undertake military coercion, as illustrated by the recent
fight against global terrorism. In the light of the conclusion that the EU
does not have the potential to construct a strong strategic culture, the
article suggests steps the EU could take to safeguard liberal achievements
in its history of integration while also enabling strategic military action
by groups of countries sharing a particular view of the world, an interest
in a particular conflict, or both.
Regional Effects of Terrorism on Tourism in Three Mediterranean
Drakos, Konstantinos; Kutan, Ali M.
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, vol.
47, no. 5, pp. 621-641, October 2003
A consumer-choice theoretical model
is developed to test the regional effects of terrorism on competitors'
market shares in the tourism sector where involved countries enjoy
significant tourism activities but are subject to a high frequency of
terrorist attacks. Using data for three Mediterranean countriesaGreece,
Israel, and Turkeyafor the period from January 1991 to December 2000,
results show significant own and spillover effects of terrorism on market
shares. Terrorist incidents are decomposed to better identify the impacts
of terrorism on tourism. Significant contagion effects of terrorism on
market shares in the region are documented, as is evidence of the effect of
terrorism on the substitutability between countries.