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Nuclear Nonproliferation
(Released December 2002)

 
  by David Lindsay  

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  1. Arms Races, Militarization, and War

    Schofield, Julian

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2002, 62, 12, June, 4320-A.

    The main purpose of this dissertation is to propose and test a link between arms races and war. The statistical study of arms races, beginning in 1979, had by the mid-1990s, reached a consensus that there was a moderately significant relationship between arming and war. A survey of traditional approaches to the study of arms races concludes that the quantitative approach had failed both to link a specific pattern of arms racing to war, or to provide a theoretical link between arms racing an war. The literature survey concludes that the case study approach provides the best promise. The dissertation argues that the link between arms races and war can best be understood through the effect arms races have on the militarization of a state's decision-making process. Militarization increases the likelihood of war through five normative and structural consequences, each of which is developed as an individual hypothesis and tested. The cause of the militarization is controlled for in order to determine whether it was the result of the arms race or preexisting conditions relating to the state's civil-military relations. The militarization as the explanation for war is juxtaposed against two competing explanations: the availability of offensive-alliances, and the speed of the preceding arms race conflict spiral. The hypotheses are applied to seven monadic cases of arms racing and war: Pakistan and the 1965 war, India and the 1971 war, Israel and the 1956 war, Israel and the 1967 war, Egypt and the 1971 war, Iran and the 1969-1975 war, Iraq and the 1980 war. The dissertation concludes that there is evidence for a moderate relationship between militarization and war; that weapons can be constituted a cause of war under only very rare circumstances; that arms control is most fruitfully focused on demilitarization in the context of arms races.

  2. The Future of Export Controls: Developing New Strategies for Nonproliferation

    Yuan, Jing-Dong

    International Politics, 2002, 39, 2, June, 131-151.

    Export controls remain an important instrument to international nonproliferation efforts in that they raise the cost of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition & development, buy time, & deny known & potential proliferant actors easy access to items & technologies that are either indispensable to WMD development or can make critical differences in existing arsenals. However, making export controls effective requires strengthening both multilateral export control regimes & national export control systems; shifting away from only focusing on selected items /technologies to greater attention to potential destabilizing military applications in prospective end-user(s)/end-use; &, better & more regular intelligence & information sharing. Export controls based on the mission/mandates of existing international nonproliferation regimes such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) & Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will have greater legitimacy & therefore relatively more ready acceptance among exporters & importers alike. 2 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

  3. Assessing the Optimism-Pessimism Debate: Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Risks, and Theories of State Action

    Busch, Nathan Edward

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2002, 62, 11, May, 3927-A.

    This dissertation focuses on the current debate in international relations literature over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this subject, IR scholars are divided into roughly two schools: proliferation "optimists," who argue that proliferation can be beneficial and that its associated hazards are at least surmountable, and proliferation "pessimists," who believe the opposite. This debate centers upon a theoretical disagreement about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. Optimists generally ground their arguments on rational deterrence theory and maintain that nuclear weapons can actually increase stability among states, while pessimists often ground their arguments on "organization theory," which contends that organizational, bureaucratic, and other factors prevent states from acting rationally. A major difficulty with the proliferation debate, however, is that both sides tend to advance their respective theoretical positions without adequately supporting them with solid empirical evidence. This dissertation detailed analyses of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to determine whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). These case studies identify the strengths and weaknesses of different systems of nuclear controls and help predict what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ. On the basis of the evidence gathered from these cases, this dissertation concludes that a further spread of nuclear weapons would tend to have seriously negative effects on international stability by increasing risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and risks of thefts of fissile materials for use in nuclear or radiological devices by aspiring nuclear states or terrorist groups.

  4. Valleys of Vulnerability: Instability in Asymmetric Nuclear Rivalries

    Goldstein, Lyle Jared

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2002, 62, 11, May, 3927-A-3928-A.

    Conflict in the present era is likely to occur between states possessing radically asymmetric weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, as suggested by the Persian Gulf War and the 1994 war scare on the Korean peninsula. Yet the discussion of the consequences of WMD proliferation for international conflict has been overshadowed by our experience with the superpowers' essentially symmetric nuclear relationship of the late Cold War. This study highlights the importance of studying conflict dyads that more closely approximate contemporary proliferation situations. Seeking to understand the consequences of proliferation, five separate asymmetric nuclear rivalries are systematically compared. The conclusions cast serious doubt on the widely held doctrine in political science of "proliferation optimism." Rather, the evidence supports the contention of the so-called "proliferation pessimists," that small WMD arsenals do not deter and are destabilizing. Indeed, the evidence presented here suggests that states possessing nascent WMD capabilities have cause to fear. The study hypothesizes that instability may be an intrinsic feature of asymmetric WMD interaction.

  5. Policy and Nuclear Proliferation: How Arms Control Encourages Proliferation

    Tkacik, Michael

    International Politics, 2002, 39, 1, Mar, 53-74.

    It is generally accepted that arms control enhances nonproliferation efforts. This article examines interactions between arms control proposals in the near to midterm & nonproliferation, & argues that some arms control actually provides incentives for increased proliferation. Bilateral arms control has shown little if any impact on nonproliferation efforts. Multilateral arms control, however, may well strengthen the nonproliferation regime (the general regime, not simply the treaty). Another area of interest is the interaction between the prohibitions on chemical & biological weapons & nuclear proliferation. Here, I argue that retaining the option to respond to biological use with nuclear weapons does not hinder nonproliferation efforts. Finally, I suggest that a unilateral & absolute no-first-use commitment by the US would actually encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Adapted from the source document.

  6. Sanctions and Reinforcement in Strategic Relationships: Carrots and Sticks, Compellence and Deterrence

    Amini, Gitty Madeline

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2002, 62, 8, Feb, 2878-A.

    This dissertation investigates international influence strategies, such as deterrence and compellence, from a prospect theory perspective. It hypothesizes that the effects of the reference point on an adversary's risk preferences can be manipulated by the mixed use of incentives and disincentives. Also, the implications of framing were applied to the strategic circumstances of deterrence and compellence. This indicated that compellence may place the target state in the domain of loss and deterrence tends to be associated with the domain of gain, but that these divisions are do not hold universally. Moreover, the study suggests that the temporal orientation of positive and negative tactics--rewards and punishments are present-oriented while promises and threats are future-oriented--is an important consideration in their effective use. Thus, multiple sets of competing hypotheses were generated: (1) a simple set of expectations derived from prospect theory; (2) a more sophisticated model involving multiple steps and stressing the correct use of carrots and sticks, at appropriate times, and in the prescribed sequence; and (3) a set of conditions derived from the standard theories of rational deterrence and compellence. These hypotheses were tested by comparing three historical cases: (1) the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; (2) the prelude to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; (3) the nuclear and missile proliferation stand-offs between the United States and North Korea in the 1990s. Consistent with the hypotheses of the complex model, the results show that states can greatly affect their adversary's framing of the reference point before it is set. Additionally, after the opponent's baseline is established, the coercing state can minimize the target state's propensity to take risks by issuing an appropriate threat in the proper manner and, if called for, by offering a last-minute conditional inducement.

  7. The Nuclear Disarmament Chimera

    Smith, Ron

    New Zealand International Review, 2002, 27, 1, Jan-Feb, 7-10.

    Asserts that the goal of nuclear disarmament is impossible to achieve as long as nuclear states see their arsenals as essential to their security & the knowledge to make nuclear weapons is available. It is virtually impossible to insure that no state is producing nuclear weapons, & technological innovations make it increasingly easier to manufacture them. Neither the US nor Russia will give up its weapons. India intends to keep its weapons & to modernize them. China & Pakistan will follow India. Iraq & Iran may develop weapons in spite of anti-proliferation pressures, & other countries may as well. Nuclear disarmament is unlikely, & the acceptance of nuclear deterrence should be emphasized. R. Larsen.

  8. Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions

    Utgoff, Victor A

    Survival, 2002, 44, 2, summer, 85-102.

    Several aggressive states seek nuclear weapons & long-range ballistic missiles. They may hope to conquer their neighbors without risking intervention by outsiders. If the willingness of the US & others to stand up to nuclear-backed regional aggression were cast in doubt, nuclear proliferation would likely accelerate, with painful global consequences. Thus, missile defenses are needed to underwrite confidence that the US & its partners would continue to protect others against regional aggression. Further, such protectors have an overwhelming moral claim to defenses to reduce their risks. Finally, the rest of the world need not worry that defenses would turn the US into an aggressive hegemon, for three reasons: (1) Practical defenses will be far from perfect. (2) The rest of the world has the basic resources to contain the US if this somehow became necessary. (3) The US's deep historical dedication to democracy renders it psychologically incapable of seeking to become the world's dictator. Adapted from the source document.

  9. THE CRIMINALITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

    Boyle, Francis A

    216pp, Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2002

    The foundations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime are in disarray following the US unilateral abrogation of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty under the George W. Bush administration. The Nuclear Posture Review recently produced by the Pentagon under Bush reverts to the position that nuclear force could be used under certain tactical scenarios. The illegality & nuclear nihilism in pursuing this path proposed by Bush & the US nuclear power elite are described, using well-recognized principles of international law. Besides rejecting a score of momentous international accords, this expansionist administration threatens the basic domestic rights & freedoms encompassed in the Rule of Law & the US Constitution, & must be challenged using the arguments presented here. Philip Berrigan provides a Foreword. M. Pflum.

  10. Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction. An Evaluation of International Security Regime Significance

    Parker, Charles F

    Dissertation Abstracts International, C: Worldwide, 2002, 63, 1, spring, 33-C.

    Abstract not available

  11. Steps to Devalue/Delegitimize Nuclear Weapons

    Sethi, Manpreet

    International Studies, 2002, 39, 1, Jan-Mar, 65-78.

    Suggests that the best way to set the groundwork for eventual global disarmament among contemporary nuclear weapon states (NWSs) is to devalue & delegitimize such weapons. Arguing against the deterrence perspective, reasons why disarmament must be devalued are identified: nuclear conflagration, proliferation, & terrorism. It is contended that the devaluation of nuclear weapons must originate from the same reasons that NWSs use to maintain their weapons stockpiles, ie, beliefs about security/insecurity, perceptions of threat, & deeply entrenched value systems. Steps that must be taken in the devaluation/delegitimization process include changing mindsets, restricting the role of nuclear weapons, reexamining nuclear doctrines, accepting a policy of "no first use," banning the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, reducing arms stockpiles & alert levels, halting further research & development for nuclear modernization, restricting delivery systems, legalizing penalties for cheating, & investing confidence in arms control & nonproliferation treaties. Recognizing that such actions are based on logic & common sense, & that NWSs will often choose positions not dictated by the same, a reality check is offered of the current (Apr 2001) situation, including the identification of an "endemic syllogistic fallacy" in the extant nonproliferation treaty. K. Hyatt Stewart.

  12. The Founder of the Critical Science Movement: The Philosopher of the Social Action: Bertrand Russell (18 May 1872-2 Feb. 1970)

    Sharma, Dhirendra

    Philosophy and Social Action, 2001, 27, 4, Oct-Dec, 65-70.

    Examines the life of philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), who founded the critical science movement. His efforts to warn the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons ultimately led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author summarizes the main achievements of Russell's life, including his views on sex & morality. The article also presents several anecdotes regarding Russell's legendary interactions with other scientists, conservative Christians, world leaders, & women. J. R. Callahan.

  13. Alliances, Assurances, Security Guarantees and Non-Proliferation: A Model for Empirical Analysis

    Foran, Virginia Irene

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2001, 62, 3, Sept, 1192-A.

    Drawing from the literature on alliance formation and foreign policy substitution, I construct a multivariate model of nuclear weapons decision-making to test the dominant paradigmatic explanation for nuclear proliferation. Other things equal, states choose to develop nuclear weapons because they are severely threatened by another state. (Betts 1980; Coffey 1977; Davis 1993; Dunn and Kahn 1976; Epstein 1976; Frankel 1993; Gilpatric 1965; Mearsheimer 1993; May 1994; Nye 1985; Potter 1982; Quester 1973; Waltz 1981; Yager 1980) Alliances are an intervening variable that mitigates the threat and thereby reduces the need to develop nuclear weapons. (Nye 1986; Meyer 1984) Not all alliances are created equal, however. In the nuclear arms versus allies trade-off, only alliances that can reliably provide the resources the threatened state needs to deter the aggressor state will be sufficient. If the paradigm is correct, then states that considered developing nuclear weapons should experience significantly more severe threats than states that did not consider developing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, states that are members of class I alliances (COW) should be significantly less likely to consider developing nuclear weapons and if they do consider developing them, they should be significantly less likely to actually develop them. Using level of threat as defined and coded in the ICB2 data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1988), I find that states that considered developing nuclear weapons were threatened more severely and more often than states that did not consider developing nuclear weapons. However, empirical tests show that reliable strong alliances are not a mitigating factor in either the decision to consider developing nuclear weapons or in the decision to proceed with a nuclear weapons program. This result implies that while non-proliferation efforts should include attempts to resolve threats to a state's security as a way of affecting the nuclear weapons decision-making process at the outset, offers of alliances or other types of security assistance are unlikely to be persuasive enough substitutes to prevent the state from proceeding to consider and perhaps to develop nuclear weapons.

  14. Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization Movement

    Epstein, Barbara

    Monthly Review, 2001, 53, 4, Sept, 1-14.

    Reasons for the increasing attraction of anarchism & the declining interest in Marxist socialism in the US are considered. A historical overview of leftist movements & organizations in the US & of the shifting popularity between Marxist & anarchism during the 20th century's first half is presented. Integration of messianic sentiment into anarchist movements during the 1960s is discussed; & the combination of anarchist, feminist, & environmentalist perspectives in forming nonviolence mass obedience demonstrations, particularly against the proliferation of nuclear power, is addressed. Despite the continued legacy of these anarchist-influenced movements, aspects of anarchism are deemed highly problematic, eg, absence of clearly defined leadership. It is argued that anarchism has emerged in current American society in the form of movements against globalization processes; however, many participants in these struggles do not consider themselves anarchist. The centrality of the debate concerning the acceptability of violence in antiglobalization movements is also addressed. It is concluded that the emergence of a new leftist movement in the US will most likely combine elements of traditional anarchism & Marxism. J. W. Parker.

  15. Buying Peace and Security? U.S. Positive Economic Inducement Strategies for Reducing Regional Conflicts and Retarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation

    Lasensky, Scott B

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2001, 62, 2, Aug, 763-A.

    Are peace and security simply commodities for sale? While a great deal of International Relations literature is devoted to negative and punitive policy instruments like the use of force and economic sanctions, not enough attention has been given to the role of positive tools. This study identifies the conditions under which positive economic inducement strategies (PEIS) are effective in reducing regional conflicts and stemming weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. It also examines how such strategies are formulated and implemented. The dissertation relies on in-depth cases studies based on the focused comparative method. The centerpiece case is US policy and the Arab-Israeli conflict. American attempts to control nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Ukraine are also examined. The study draws on memoirs, media reports, and scholarly material. In addition, several dozen policymaker interviews were conducted. PEIS alone cannot influence bargaining over security goods. Pure checkbook diplomacy does not work. However, this study demonstrates that PEIS help reduce first-order security threats like regional conflicts and WMD proliferation by reassuring recipients and providing alternative security goods. But to be effective, economic inducements must manifest other positive political and security assurances. With adversarial states, they must also be used together with coercive measures. Integrated strategies are critical to PEIS utility. Economic inducements also function as diplomatic "follow-through." They can enable the implementation of agreements and sustain step-by-step negotiating processes. Their value is prospective and on-going, not immediate. Since the end of the Cold War, utility has increased because superpower rivalries no longer corrode the effectiveness of inducements. Closer to home, US domestic politics can both constrain and encourage the use of PEIS, their impact is parabolic. In terms of the public policy agenda, the dissertation demonstrates that foreign aid for political purposes continues to serve as an effective instrument for projecting American power and achieving critical national security goals.

  16. Nuclear Proliferation in the Developing World: Causes and Consequences

    Kraig, Michael Ryan

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2001, 61, 12, June, 4941-A.

    This work addresses the debate over the potential viability of nuclear deterrence between the newly-nuclear states in the developing world. Currently, the scholarly community is split into two opposed and mutually exclusive groups. One group believes in the efficacy of deterrence and thus tends to favor proliferation, while another grouping of research efforts questions the viability of deterrence in both the First and Third World. This dissertation is an attempt to synthesize and formalize the key questions of this debate through (1) a literature review and explicit framing of what are often only implicit hypotheses in the pro-deterrence school; (2) a historical analysis of the causes of proliferation in the developing world, with a focus on those conflict characteristics that describe the position of international "outcasts" across problem regions (the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia); (3) a look at the consequences of nuclear proliferation through a historical critique of Cold War nuclear deterrence; and (4) a game-theoretic model that incorporates structural characteristics which address the specific circumstances of regional rivals. The results show severe weaknesses in the pro-proliferation school. Historically, the presence of competing ideological perceptions in rivalries has led to fears of nuclear blackmail, attempts to achieve escalation dominance in force deployments, and anxieties about conventional and nuclear force imbalances that could undermine stability. Deductively, in the confines of the game model, nuclear blackmail is still possible if threat crediblity at the nuclear level favors one side or if conventional force imbalances exist. Nuclear weapons generally fail to bridge the gap left by incapable conventional forces, and stability is always tied to particular variations of threat credibility and capability, rather than resting solely on the mutual possession of nuclear weapons by both rivals. Deterrence between developing countries is neither simple nor preordained. Although nuclear weapons might in some cases bestow status-quo stability between rivals that are under the constant threat of major attacks, they should be viewed as temporary military expedients at best, rather than long-term policy solutions.

  17. 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference

    Imai, Ryukichi

    Asia-Pacific Review, 2001, 8, 1, May, 51-62.

    The 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that was recently held in New York may have closed with a consensus on an "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT of 1968, but it did not discuss how this would be achieved. Ryukichi Imai, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Instit for International Policy Studies (IIPS), Tokyo, argues in this article that despite the diplomatic success of the 2000 Review Conference, the results are in reality less satisfactory: the US & Russia continue to conduct their business with a lack of transparency; there was no discussion of the current dangers of proliferation; & no agenda for the future was set, allowing the nuclear threat to remain, particularly in North East Asia. 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

  18. Politics and Physics: Epistemic Communities and the Origins of United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

    Carter, Alexandra G

    Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2001, 61, 9, Mar, 3746-A.

    This project tests whether hypotheses generated by the literature on epistemic communities can help explain the sources of international cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation. The main question driving this study is how the United States came to define its interests in nuclear non-proliferation as being best served by moving from a policy of unilateral denial to a multilateral regime based on information sharing and inspection. The argument presented here is that United States preferences were shaped in significant part by the influence of an epistemic community on policy processes. The study uses structured, focused case comparison methods to examine several significant non-proliferation decisions: the initial decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan; the decision to pursue international control; the decisions to accelerate development and deployment of the hydrogen bomb; and the decision to pursue what became the Atoms for Peace policy. Taken together, the outcomes of these decisions form the foundations of United States interests in the non-proliferation regime as we see it today. The study concludes that the United States' interests in non-proliferation cooperation were not the direct, immediate result of epistemic community influence. The community was limited in its influence by the strength of Realist concerns over the central security issues raised by the advent of atomic weapons. However, the community did help frame issues in accordance with their beliefs in information sharing and inspection, and thereby exert long-term influence on United States policy. The study also offers modifications of several epistemic community hypotheses, including those concerning community unanimity, the effects of splits within communities, and the effects of timing and access on community influence. For further research, the study proposes both a continuation of the study of United States preference formation over time (through the negotiation and ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970), as well as an extension of the work to investigate the possible influence of a transnational epistemic community on the preferences of other nations.

  19. Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-Based Threat Assessment

    Badey, Thomas J

    Intelligence and National Security, 2001, 16, 2, summer, 39-54.

    The assumption that policies reducing the proliferation of fissile materials will automatically reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is fallacious. Even if moderately successful, antiproliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials & are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors. Current policies focus on the containment of fissile materials rather than on non-state actors who may wish to acquire them. Concentrating principally on management, accounting, storage, & transfer procedures, policymakers seem to ignore the fact that the primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire them. This paper attempts to shift the focus of discussion from state-centric models of analysis to a threat or actor-based model of analysis. In doing so, the paper seeks to identify risk factors, which in combination may indicate a willingness by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition it hopes to provide the basis for more effective threat assessments. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

  20. Integrated Safeguards: Status and Trends

    Bragin, Victor; Carlson, John; Leslie, Russell

    Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 8, 2, summer, 102-110.

    Classical safeguards ostensibly ensure that all states participating in nonproliferation treaties comply with the treaty's terms. However, Iraq's evasion of classical safeguards demonstrates the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IACA) need to revisit its dual assumptions that: (1) states with nuclear capacity & materials would declare as much; & (2) states seeking clandestine nuclearization would need to obtain nuclear materials from known sources. The authors argue for strengthening safeguards, emphasizing the importance of shifting from mechanistic measures to intelligent, integrated ones. These integrated safeguards would entail greater complementarity regarding access to nuclearized or potentially nuclearized facilities; continuous state evaluations; greater unpredictability of inspections; & prioritizing, with decreased emphasis given to lesser nuclear materials. These proposed improvements would not dispense with classical safeguards so much as render them more flexible & thus more applicable to state-specific proliferation concerns. K. Coddon.

  21. National Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty: No Need to Wreck the Accord

    Coyle, Philip E; Rhinelander, John B

    World Policy Journal, 2001, 18, 3, fall, 15-22.

    The argument is developed that a unilateral move by the US to undermine or abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia is unwise. The Russian arsenal of nuclear weapons still constitutes the largest threat to the US. If the proliferation of ballistic missiles by rogue states drives US development, this development should proceed in accordance with Russia, which still sees the treaty as useful. National missile defense technology is still immature, so the push for development & the rejection of the ABM Treaty as necessary policy is not due to imminent development but to US domestic politics, ie, President George W. Bush's campaign promise to speed deployment. If the US withdraws from the Treaty, the larger arms control regime, including the pending Strategic Arms reduction Treaty & the Non-Proliferation Treaty, could collapse. M. Pflum.

  22. Seven Worries about START III

    Clark, Mark T

    Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 2001, 45, 2, spring, 175-191.

    Explores the proposed third version of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to argue that the suggested limits of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons per side would be neither safe nor stabilizing. Although favored by many politicians, the Pentagon has questioned the proposal's impact on strategic stability, & no budgetary rationale for decreasing the US arsenal to that level has been presented. Seven interrelated issues related to the efficacy of the low START III numbers are examined: the deterrence theory; effects on strategic stability; lack of balance among all nuclear/related forces; asymmetrical political objectives; extended nuclear deterrence guarantees; effects on proliferation; & the likelihood of compliance/consequences of noncompliance. Graphical comparisons of US & Russian strategic forces show that, if both sides reduce strategic nuclear weapons to the suggested START III level, a great imbalance emerges in favor of Russia when tactical nuclear weapons are taken into consideration. It is contended that extreme reductions would deprive the US of all flexibility & undermine US security as well as global stability. 4 Figures. J. Lindroth.

  23. The Determinants of Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Membership-Fee Explanation

    Cupitt, Richard T; Grillot, Suzette; Murayama, Yuzo

    Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 8, 2, summer, 69-80.

    Multilateral export controls remain a major post-Cold War policy issue. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, information technology presents a new medium for the dissemination of nuclear know-how; individual nations differ as to which countries pose a proliferation threat. Consequently, more governments are engaged one way or another in formulating policy regarding export controls, including nations considered themselves to be proliferation risks, eg, China, Israel, & India. The authors investigate, compare, & assess export control policies in 20 nations & their implications. The article examines the common economic as well as political interests, & calls for a "membership-fee framework" among liberal democratic governments as regards nonproliferation export controls. International cooperation benefits the global community in the post-Cold War era, offering trade incentives to nondemocratic nations like China & Korea when they comply, & conversely, imposing economic sanctions when they do not. K. Coddon.

  24. Negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention

    Green, Robert

    Philosophy and Social Action, 2001, 27, 1, Jan-Mar, 49-55.

    Argues that nothing but political will is preventing world powers from negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention. It is noted that the World Court's 1996 Advisory Opinion, which supports the legality of antinuclear measures, could serve as a mechanism to ease verification & enforcement. The debate surrounding a 1997 UN discussion draft describing a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention is examined, noting the plan's outline of a series of graduated, verifiable steps for the prohibition & eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It is contended that nonconfrontational discussions could revive the impetus toward nuclear disarmament & lead to multilateral talks. A process similar to that used to secure an International Criminal Court statute banning antipersonnel landmines is suggested for igniting nuclear weapons negotiations. The possibilities of amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty &/or consolidating the Southern Hemisphere as a nuclear weapons free zone are assessed. Other issues discussed include progress toward establishing a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, & the need to eliminate the perceived link between possession of nuclear arsenals & permanent seats on the UN Security Council. J. Lindroth.

  25. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order

    Hall, Gwen (Review of: Utgoff, Victor A [Ed])

    International Studies Review, 2001, 3, 3, fall, 172-176.

  26. Nuclear Arms Control and Ballistic Missile Defence

    Kile, Shannon N

    SIPRI Yearbook, 2001, 423-486.

    In 2000, the nuclear arms control agenda was dominated by the international controversy over US plans for a limited national missile defense system & its proposal to amend the 1972 ABM Treaty to permit it to deploy such a system. This dispute overshadowed the Russian Parliament's ratification of the 1993 START II Treaty & complicated US-Russian efforts to negotiate further nuclear force reductions. At the same time, there appeared to be growing interest in both countries in reducing nuclear arsenals outside the framework of traditional arms control treaties. One positive development for nuclear arms control was that the 2000 Review Conference of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document setting out a number of concrete nuclear disarmament goals. 10 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

  27. Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility

    Koremenos, Barbara

    International Organization, 2001, 55, 2, spring, 289-325.

    How can states credibly make & keep agreements when they are uncertain about the distributional implications of their cooperation? They can do so by incorporating the proper degree of flexibility into their agreements. I develop a formal model in which an agreement characterized by uncertainty may be renegotiated to incorporate new information. The uncertainty is related to the division of gains under the agreement, with the parties resolving this uncertainty over time as they gain experience with the agreement. The greater the agreement uncertainty, the more likely states will want to limit the duration of the agreement & incorporate renegotiation. Working against renegotiation is noise - ie, variation in outcomes not resulting from the agreement. The greater the noise, the more difficult it is to learn how an agreement is actually working; hence, incorporating limited duration & renegotiation provisions becomes less valuable. In a detailed case study, I demonstrate that the form of uncertainty in my model corresponds to that experienced by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, who adopted the solution my model predicts. 2 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 56 References. Adapted from the source document.

  28. For Modest Defences and Low Offensive Numbers

    Lodal, Jan M

    Survival, 2001, 43, 3, autumn, 71-74.

    In part of a colloquium titled "A Consensus on Missile Defence?" it is noted that terrorist groups & states that oppose the US & its dominant position in the world are likely to use nuclear, chemical, & biological weapons. A successful response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation must also include drastically improved intelligence & law enforcement, tighter export controls, & combined multilateral pressure on states that continue proliferation activities or harbor terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, the author contends that even though this analysis is based on long-standing US nuclear-war planning doctrine, a reduction in numbers of strategic nuclear weapons is feasible. The author lists several realities to be recognized by the major powers to establish a new equilibrium with lower levels of offensive nuclear forces, limited national missile defense, & a combined effort to stop the proliferation of WMD. Adapted from the source document.

  29. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests and World Order

    Elman, Colin (Review of: Utgoff, Victor A [Ed])

    Political Science Quarterly, 2001-2002, 116, 4, winter, 643-644.

  30. Good Grief! The Politics of Debating NMD: A Reply to Frank Harvey

    Mutimer, David

    International Journal, 2001, 56, 2, spring, 330-346.

    Mutimer uses Frank Harvey's "The International Politics of National Missile Defence: A Response to the Critics" (2000) as a door to further Canadian consideration of the issue. It is asserted that the article exemplifies a sea change in tactics used by defense proponents. Labeling himself a national missile defense (NMD) critic, the author attempts an assessment of the pros & cons of weapons build-up as well as refutation of several of Harvey's points. There is review of the costs of nuclear build-up & of Harvey's reversal of "the burden of proof" regarding support for these costs. Harvey's meshing of disparate missile defense opponents under the "critic" label is questioned. There is criticism of Harvey's intertwining & attempted undermining of two cases made against NMD. There is discussion of proliferation & arms control among countries not allied with the US & of Chinese & Russian concerns. The purported political duplicity of altering the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty is reviewed. Mutimer sees renewed missile defense sentiments as a reaction to the increased possession of advanced weaponry by "rogues." There is examination of "rogue" states & of US involvement in their development. 1 Table. M. C. Leary.

  31. Economic and Technological Trends Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Erickson, Stanley A

    Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 8, 2, summer, 40-54.

    The article examines political, economic, & technological trends that have influenced both nuclear proliferation & nonproliferation movements. The author considers a variety of reasons behind India's & Pakistan's decision to develop nuclear weapons programs, eg, internal & external security concerns & the enhancement of international status & leverage. Yet a number of nonproliferation tactics have proven effective: nonproliferation treaties; the high costs of producing & sustaining nuclear arsenals; controls on technological expertise; international inspections & subsequent diplomatic consequences should a clandestine nuclear program be discovered; & coerced (military) containment, such as the US exercised against Libya & Iraq. However, these safeguards may not be adequate to recent & continuing economic & technological developments in mid-sized states that are minimizing costs, delay, & risk factors. The author urges immediate attention to improving the detection & assessment of nuclear proliferation. 1 Table. K. Coddon.

  32. Management, Abolition, and Nullification: Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies in the 21th Century

    Ayson, Robert

    Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 8, 3, fall-winter, 67-81.

    The current state of global nuclear proliferation & the key successes & failures of the three main strategies to address proliferation are explored. The management strategy relies on arms control; in the abolition strategy, nonproliferation is a step towards complete nuclear disarmament; & the nullification strategy involves military countermeasures as deterrents. Mixed strategies also have current support, in particular, the cooperation between missile defense advocates who support a variation of nullification & disarmament activists. However, any cooperation would involve commitments on the part of the missile defense side to achieve nuclear reductions. The policy positions of New Zealand, working toward abolition through international legal mechanisms, & the US, where arguments for missile defense weigh more heavily than multilateral arms control, are compared. M. Pflum.

  33. The Illicit Traffic in Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

    Zarimpas, Nicholas

    SIPRI Yearbook, 2001, 503-511.

    Illicit trafficking in nuclear & radioactive materials could pose serious national & international security threats. Apart from the obvious implications for nuclear proliferation, illicit trafficking could create a multitude of public health, safety, & environmental risks. Despite the decline since 1995 in the number of reported cases of illicit trafficking involving fissile material & the fact that a major proliferation catastrophe has so far been averted, challenges will remain for a long time to come. The current situation regarding illicit trafficking is addressed by analyzing publicly available information & developments over the past 10 years as well as the measures designed to combat this problem. Adapted from the source document.

  34. Verification of the Implementation of Disarmament Agreements

    Karkoszka, Andrzej

    Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2001, 10, 2, spring, 52-72.

    Examines problems with determining that the various parties to arms control agreements have complied with the terms of those agreements & reduced their production & supply of weapons &/or armed forces. Though the verification-of-compliance problem was discussed at the 1932-1936 World Disarmament Conference, no actual treaties on arms control were made until after WWII. The issue received more attention in the ensuing years, but it was not until the end of the Cold War & the opening of East-West relations that any major mechanisms of verification were implemented. Various treaties enacted during the late 1980s & throughout the 1990s are described, arguing that their comprehensive procedures for verification (unthinkable during the Cold War) did much to promote bi- & multilateral arms control practice. Lessons from the Cold War era that helped propel the acceptance of such agreements are outlined, along with those provided through reflection on the first decade of these new treaties in operation. Particular emphasis is placed on the strong synergistic effect between the technical aspects of various verification methods & their political uses, outcomes, & implications. Even with the present "cooperative security system" between East & West, it is argued that such interstate efforts do not extend to all parts of the world, especially not to "rogue" states & nonstate terrorist groups, making verification-of-compliance problems (particularly with respect to new biological or chemical weapons) a continuing problem. K. Hyatt Stewart.

  35. Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries

    James, Carolyn C

    Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 2000, 33, 4, Dec, 723-746.

    This article presents & establishes the significance of the Nuclear Arsenal Games, which investigates behavior within dyads experiencing a crisis. It assumes that nuclear & quasi-nuclear states act according to the size & potential of their own nuclear force structure & that of their opponent. This article argues that the size & potential damage an arsenal poses determines actor preferences within a crisis situation. The specific objective here is to propose a nuclear index for use in empirical studies & offer an example of one game-theoretic approach of crisis interaction that indicates whether preferences & predicted behavior adhere to the assumption of classical (or rational) deterrence theory. 2 Tables, 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

  36. Triumphalism and Reality in U.S. Cold War Policies

    Singer, J David

    Peace Review, 2000, 12, 4, Dec, 613-617.

    Argues that the decline of US influence in world politics is due to a combination of moral arrogance, the influence of parochial interest groups, & ignorance. It is contended that very few people in foreign policy establishments read scholarly books/journals that relate research results that challenge US foreign policies. Examples of failed policies include the alleged need to support pro-West anticommunist regimes & overturn all others. This mindset led to US endorsement of regimes guilty of imprisoning, torturing, & murdering thousands because of their politics, religion, or ethnicity. The post-WWII "preparedness" program is described as another foreign policy failure. The physical, public health, & environmental damage resulting from the production, testing, transportation, & deployment of nuclear weapons are examined, along with the contribution of US nuclear policy to the proliferation problem & the search for chemical/biological weapons by underdeveloped nations. US refusal to participate in international regimes focused on things like land mines & the environment has also lessened US influence & eroded the norms needed for a civilized human community. J. Lindroth.

  37. Proliferation and Critical Risk

    Thies, Wallace J

    The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2000, 23, 4, Dec, 51-76.

    Does proliferation increase the risk of war between new nuclear powers? Two schools of thought - proliferation pessimism & optimism - offer very different answers. The former stresses the first-strike danger of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles & the resulting crisis instability as a cause of preemptive war. The latter stresses the caution-inducing effects of nuclear warheads & fear of retaliation as a check on would-be attackers. To bridge the gap between these two schools, Daniel Ellsberg's concept of critical risk is used to show how the likelihood of war changes as new nuclear powers enlarge & improve their missile forces. Ellsberg's framework suggests that the danger of war is low between recent proliferators but rises as nuclear stockpiles grow, thereby changing the payoffs associated with striking first or striking second & increasing the danger of war due to accidents, miscalculations, & uncontrollable interactions between rival nuclear forces. Ellsberg's framework also suggests that the transition from weaponization to secure second strike force is likely to be long & difficult, in part because short-range missiles like India's Prithvi are better suited to strike first than to strike second, & in part because negative control procedures reduce the value of striking second, thereby increasing the attraction of a preemptive strike. Adapted from the source document.

  38. Nuclear Order and Disorder

    Walker, William

    International Affairs, 2000, 76, 4, Oct, 703-724.

    After a decade of great progress in diminishing the risks posed by nuclear weapons, international nuclear relations came unstuck in the late 1990s. Why did this happen? This question is best answered through an understanding of how a "nuclear order" was constructed during the Cold War, how it developed in the early post-Cold War period, & how confidence in it dissipated as the 1990s wore on. After considering how the nuclear order was founded upon linked systems of deterrence & abstinence, the article explains how both were destabilized in the mid- to late 1990s - cause & effect of the US shifting its ordering strategy toward protection (through missile defenses) & enforcement. Can confidence in nuclear order be restored? How should we regard the recent agreement among States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement to press for complete nuclear disarmament? Adapted from the source document.

  39. International Security in the World-System: A Model of Future Dynamics

    Kowalewski, David; Hoover, Dean

    International Studies, 2000, 37, 3, July-Sept, 183-225.

    After summarizing the advantages of dynamic world models & identifying their theoretical & empirical bases, the components of a dynamic world systems model of international security are specified. The model is historically grounded in annual time-series data over a 250-year period, & equations are simulated for the effect of three types of competition - among & between core & periphery nations - & independent variables related to international security (eg, hegemonic authority, international government organizations' power, nuclear proliferation, & repressiveness). These relationships are traced across both Kondratieff long waves of global economies & hegemonic long waves of global leadership. Using regression equations for each series, the model is found to be only moderately deterministic; both historical inertia & contemporary forces affect the state of a social system (& its relationship with other systems) at any point in time. In addition, individual components of the model are found to be sensitive to "shocks" from other components. Implications of the findings for making the world system safer are discussed. 3 Tables, 2 Figures, 5 Chronographs, 1 Appendix. K. Hyatt Stewart.

  40. Contemplating a New Strategic Future

    Widen, J J

    Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2000, 23, 3, July-Sept, 215-219.

    A review essay on books by (1) Stephen J. Cimbala, The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); (2) Hubert P. Van Tuyll, America's Strategic Future - A Blueprint for National Survival in the New Millennium (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998); & (3) Roger S. Whitcomb, The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). These three texts examine the consequences of the "democratic revolution" that swept through Europe during the late 1980s & early 1990s. The principal conclusions of Cimbala's study of the future role of nuclear weapons in international policy & warfare are reviewed; eg, the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a serious problem. However, Cimbala's assertion that Western Europe would not have been vulnerable to a Soviet attack without the US's possession of nuclear arms is questioned. Van Tuyll's recommendations for future US military strategy are outlined, including both public education & military spending; however, his conclusions are critiqued for offering simplistic solutions to significant problems, eg, the costs of raising money for public education & military training programs. Whitcomb's contentions that the Cold War was inevitable & that both the US & Soviet governments were responsible for the Cold War are challenged; specific attention is directed toward the benefits of the US's moral & legalistic method of foreign policy. J. W. Parker.

  41. Testing Times: Of Nuclear Tests, Test Bans and the Framing of Proliferation

    Mutimer, David

    Contemporary Security Policy, 2000, 21, 1, Apr, 1-22.

    The conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 is considered one of the crowning achievements of post-Cold War nuclear nonproliferation. However, the open test of nuclear weapons in 1998, first by India & then Pakistan, is, perhaps, the nadir of nonproliferation efforts. This article argues that, ironically, these two outcomes are intimately interconnected. During the Cold War, nuclear testing was framed a disarmament issue. Since the Gulf War of 1991, issues of nuclear testing have come to be reframed as part of broad agenda of proliferation control. This reframing created the conditions in which it was possible in 1996 for the CTBT to be agreed on. However, producing a CTBT as part of the proliferation control agenda, in turn, created the conditions in which it was possible for India openly to test nuclear weapons, after more than 20 years of restraint. Adapted from the source document.

  42. Beliefs, Culture, Proliferation and Use of Nuclear Weapons

    Heuser, Beatrice

    The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2000, 23, 1, Mar, 74-100.

    A state-focused analysis is insufficient in explaining why countries have in the past acquired nuclear weapons or chosen not to do so. This can only be understood if one factors in the analysis of beliefs specific to the predominant culture in the respective states. Even taking these into consideration, it is not always possible to predict a state's behavior in times of war as can be demonstrated by past decisions to resort to large-scale city bombing (with conventional ordnance or with nuclear weapons). These decisions were functions of personal convictions of individual key decisionmakers, & did not necessarily reflect the overall beliefs of the culture from which they sprang. In-depth analysis of cultures & even individual key decisionmakers' beliefs is thus vital. Adapted from the source document.

  43. International Seminar on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: A Concept Paper

    Development Dialogue, 2000, 1-2, 34-45.

    This Concept Paper has two basic purposes - & audiences. It was originally developed as a background document to the Seminar on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. It became evident, however, during the comparatively long time over which the paper was developed, that it would also serve the much broader purpose of being a general introduction to the subject for a much wider group of people. It is for the latter reason that the paper is published here. It is divided into three parts. The first describes the situation in the field of disarmament since the end of the Cold War & lists & discusses both positive developments & significant setbacks. The second part deals with the existing nuclear weapon-free zones & what lessons can be learned from their different patterns of development. The third part, finally, discusses prospective nuclear weapon-free zones & the chances of implementing them within a shorter or longer time-frame. A very important point made in this section is that in order to create new zones the concept will have to be transformed to become much more of an active measure of nuclear arms reduction & abolition & not just a means of nonproliferation. Adapted from the source document.

  44. Traditional Values for the Digital Age

    Blair, Tony

    The Responsive Community, 2000, 10, 4, fall, 52-58.

    Focuses on the values needed to manage the opportunities/dangers of the digital age. It is contended that a notion of community built on equal worth is the best expression of these values because it solves a contemporary dilemma by recognizing both individual worth & interdependence. In addition, it acknowledges the traditionalist's emphasis on family life, as well as the modernist's acceptance of diversity. Community at the international level is based on the equal worth, mutual rights, & shared responsibilities of nations. While acceding that some conflicts are inevitable as nations pursue their self-interest, they will be greatly diminished by mutual understandings of shared problems. Areas discussed include free trade, debt relief, the global drug trade, environmental destruction, advanced technology, & threats of nuclear proliferation. The added dimension of interfaith understanding is addressed, maintaining that peace is not possible without religious dialogue that recognizes differences while emphasizing the common elements of solidarity, justice, peace, & individual dignity. J. Lindroth.

  45. The International Politics of National Missile Defence: A Response to the Critics

    Harvey, Frank P

    International Journal, 2000, 55, 4, autumn, 545-566.

    Exposes some logical & factual errors in the arguments of critics of national missile defense (NMD). Four core tenets of arguments against deployment are attacked: (1) demise of arms control agreements, (2) nuclear proliferation by Russia & the People's Republic of China, (3) technological limitations of interceptor technology, & (4) financial costs. Examples of such arguments are drawn from many sources, particularly the disarmament organization Project Ploughshares. Specific implications for Canadian defense & security policies are addressed. It is argued that political agendas unfairly shape arguments against NMD, & a more balanced & substantive debate is called for. K. Hyatt Stewart.

  46. Some Possible Surprises in Our Nuclear Future

    Quester, George H

    Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2000, 11, 2, autumn, 38-51.

    In this essay, the author makes the argument that current moves to reduce the number of nuclear weapons from their present levels toward zero may well generate some unpleasant surprises. Some surprises may be pleasant, but others might not. That is, the reduction of US & Russian nuclear weapons to zero or near zero could encourage strategic instability & nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the global community. In any case, we really do not have a very good idea about what this new "non-nuclear" world will be like. We really do not know if there will be pleasant or unpleasant surprises, but there will almost certainly be surprises. One is reminded of the old saying: "Be careful what you wish for; you may get it." Adapted from the source document.

  47. Nuclear Proliferation: The Evolving Policy Debate

    Howlett, Darryl; Simpson, John

    Contemporary Security Policy, 1999, 20, 3, Dec, 198-230.

    The debate over nuclear proliferation has been characterized by two complementary, but sometimes competing, policies: one resides in the implementation of unilateral initiatives designed to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons & their related technologies; the other involves international cooperative attempts to create a nuclear nonproliferation regime. This piece traces the development of these two policies, particularly over the last two decades, & assesses the way the focus of this debate has moved between different regions, states, & functional issues. In this context, it also addresses totally unanticipated proliferation problems, such as the consequences of the collapse of the USSR. Finally, an attempt is made to project the debate over nuclear proliferation policies into the future &, especially, to assess the potential impact of new military technologies on this debate. Adapted from the source document.