Bitencourt-Emilio, Luis Antonio

Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2002, 62, 12, June, 4323-A.

This dissertation focuses on developing countries' reactions in the face of nonproliferation and export controls regimes. It centers on the effects of nonproliferation regimes--export control regimes in general and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in particular--and it draws on the experiences of three countries: Argentina, Brazil, and India. This study explores the theoretical implications of the struggles of developing countries to acquire sensitive technology as a way to advance indigenous ballistic missile and satellite launcher programs. The cross-national analysis of the developing countries' efforts to acquire ballistic missiles demonstrates that regional realities are more compelling and more determining than idealistic banners waved by nonproliferation regimes. Nevertheless, the formal arrangements that constitute regimes fulfill wider roles by offering an institutional value-paradigm of what is accepted by the international community. This study explores the questions: How have these three countries coped with MTCR and export controls? What can their experiences tell us about the future of export control regimes in the post-Cold War international order? Why, under the pressure of the export control regimes, have some developing countries--such as Argentina and Brazil--changed their programs for missile acquisition, while others--such as India--have not? This research provides a clearer picture of the regimes' primary effects on developing countries, i.e., the efficacy of the constraints imposed by regimes, as well as secondary effects, i.e., changes in domestic policies caused by regimes. In addition, it offers an improved understanding of how international regimes impact the international system. Finally, by looking into regimes effects outside of the circle of their sponsors, which is an aspect the literature largely ignores, this study contributes to widen the debate on the relevance of international regimes.

Chaulia, Sreeram S

International Politics, 2002, 39, 2, June, 215-234.

Correlation between domestic political factors & a country's foreign policy is crucial. This essay is a case study of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its ideological precepts, & approach to foreign policy making. The fundamentals of the Nehruvian world outlook, which have guided almost all pre-BJP governments in India, are first elaborated & their evolution discussed in the historical context of postindependence India. BJP core ideology & promise of radically overturning this Nehruvian consensus are then taken up & empirically tested against three significant theatres of Indian foreign policy since 1998 - nuclear proliferation, relations with Pakistan, & ties with the US. Conclusions are drawn that the Nehruvian tradition has survived BJP's rhetorical & ideological challenge & that, notwithstanding the party's braggadocio about altering the discourse on India's place & attitude toward the world, the standards & benchmarks set by Nehru at the time of freedom continue to inform the present Indian government's foreign policy. Adapted from the source document.

Lieven, Anatol

International Affairs, 2002, 78, 2, Apr, 245-259.

In this article, Anatol Lieven argues that the collapse of the Soviet & communist threats & the triumph of capitalism & bourgeois values gave the US an unprecedented chance to act as a status quo hegemon, dominating the world with the consent of other major powers. The US threw up this chance by acting instead as a "dissatisfied" & even revolutionary power, creating a sense of menace & resentment across much of the world. After the 11 Sept attacks, the near-global threat of Sunni Islamist terrorism & revolution gives the US another opportunity to rally much of the world behind it, in a kind of new "Holy Alliance" of states against threats from below. But by mixing up the struggle against terrorism with a very different effort at preventing nuclear proliferation, & by refusing to take the interests of other states into account, the US risks missing this opportunity for a second time, & endangering itself & its closest allies such as GB. Adapted from the source document.

Martin, Curtis H

Journal of Peace Research, 2002, 39, 1, Jan, 51-68.

This article tests theoretical propositions of sanctions theory against a 'crucial case study' of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, which since 1994 has employed incentives to influence North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. By electing an incentives-based strategy, the Agreed Framework appears to invalidate the proposition that positive sanctions are unlikely to be employed between adversaries. However, the choice can be explained in part by the unique political & security environment on the Korean peninsula, by the absence of viable policy alternatives for the USA & its allies, & by the relatively low cost to the USA. The subsequent history of implementation, however, amply confirms a number of theoretical caveats & leaves in doubt the ultimate success of the Agreed Framework. The case illustrates how diplomatic & political pressures on both sender & recipient have altered the baseline of expectations away from a pragmatic & partial improvement in relations & toward the sweeping & more problematic goal of an 'all or nothing' transformation of the adversarial relationship. Positive sanctions were caught between the perceived advantages of de-linking proliferation concerns from other contentious security issues & the domestic political advantages to the sender of greater linkage. The latter tendency is illustrated by the 1999 Perry plan, which abandoned 'limited engagement' in favor of a 'comprehensive & integrated approach'. While this policy shift may have bought time for administration policy, it did not resolve the contradictions inherent in a low-trust relationship. As it reassesses US policy towards the DPRK, the new US administration is likely to draw on the more skeptical view of positive incentives found in sanctions theory. The case of the Agreed Framework challenges several assumptions of sanctions theory, but it is too soon to claim that it invalidates them. 82 References. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.].

Shaikh, Farzana

International Affairs, 2002, 78, 1, Jan, 29-48.

Pakistan's status as a nuclear power, which was made manifest when it carried out six nuclear tests in May 1998, came under renewed international scrutiny following the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11. Of most immediate concern was the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which was believed to be vulnerable to Muslim terrorist groups with close links to the al-Qaida organization, headed by Osama bin Laden. However, the international crisis centering on the "war against terrorism" is bound to revive debate about Pakistan's involvement in the nuclear nonproliferation regime; the risks of a nuclear war between India & Pakistan over Kashmir; & the need for tighter curbs on the export of nuclear technology to politically volatile regions in the Muslim world. These debates are likely to be overshadowed by Pakistan's own perceptions of the danger it faces of a military threat from a nuclear-capable India; its aspirations as a regional power; & its desire to be recognized as "first among equals" in the Muslim world community of nations. Any attempt to draw Pakistan into the nonproliferation regime & to persuade it to assume its responsibilities as a nuclear power will need to address these concerns. Ultimately, however, it will be for Pakistanis to decide how long they wish to subordinate their country's economic well being to the pursuit of a nuclear program whose priorities are defined by an unaccountable military regime. Adapted from the source document.

Wolfsthal, Jon B; Collina, Tom Z

Survival, 2002, 44, 2, summer, 71-83.

Russia possesses the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons & weapons-usable nuclear materials. This Cold War legacy, inherited from the Soviet Union, is housed in an oversized, underfunded, & poorly secured weapons complex that has proven vulnerable to infiltration & theft. Yet, at a time when the US has made preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction a top priority, the Bush administration has unveiled the outlines of a nuclear policy that is exacerbating the security problem in Russia & will likely lead Russia to maintain an unnecessarily large & insecure weapons complex. The proposed policies of the administration would result in the US deploying some 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons, but maintaining a force twice as large in active reserve, ready for rapid redeployment. Russia is likely to follow suit. The proposed US policy is misguided. Instead, the US & Russia should be pushing each other to negotiate & adopt a monitored regime to securely store & eliminate nuclear weapons removed from active deployment, & ensure that the materials released from dismantled weapons are quickly, safely, & securely eliminated. Adapted from the source document.

Reiss, Mitchell B

Asian Perspective, 2002, 26, 1, 41-55.

Contrary to the early skepticism, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has not only survived; in some ways it has actually flourished. KEDO & the DPRK (North Korea) have been able to forge a solid working relationship, which has been reflected in numerous agreements that interpret & implement the original commitments set forth in the 1994 Agreed Framework. More important is what KEDO has prevented - including the halting of its reprocessing of fissile material for atomic bombs. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been allowed continuous access to monitor this "freeze." To date, there have been no publicly confirmed reports of the North cheating on this arrangement. Yet, if KEDO were judged on its ability to efficiently manage an international construction project, it would be fortunate to receive a "gentleman's C." But that may be the wrong way to assess its performance. Fundamentally, KEDO is a political endeavor, not a commercial project, & in that respect it has made a substantial contribution to peace building. Even without knowing the ultimate outcome of the KEDO project, its stabilizing presence has allowed the DPRK & the major powers in the region to begin a process of diplomatic & economic engagement. Adapted from the source document.

Cha, Victor D

The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2001, 24, 4, Dec, 79-120.

This study makes two arguments with regard to the second nuclear age in Asia. First, I argue that the causes of proliferation are overdetermined. As was the case in the first nuclear age, proliferation derives lamely from the intersection of security-scarcity, resource constraints, & domestic forces. The combination of these drivers not only ensures that proliferation is overdetermined in Asia, but also means that rollback of these capabilities is not likely. Second, I make a case for "sober optimism" regarding the prospects for stability. Swaggering, competitive testing, & outright conflicts may certainly occur, but there is no reason to expect that the likelihood of this behavior escalating to a nuclear exchange is any more probable than was the case for the first nuclear age. 4 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Hoyt, Timothy D

Asian Survey, 2001, 41, 6, Nov-Dec, 956-977.

This article examines the debate between proliferation optimists & pessimists regarding the danger of a nuclear confrontation between India & Pakistan. The author focuses on civil-military relations & civilian control of the military with respect to command & control of South Asian nuclear arsenals. He presents an analysis of Pakistan's nuclear program & its context & the evolution of nuclear doctrine after the May 1998 tests, followed by a strategic analysis of the Pakistani military & an assessment of the country's strategic performance. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of nuclear proliferation for the strategic stability of South Asia. J. R. Callahan.

Karl, David J

Asian Survey, 2001, 41, 6, Nov-Dec, 1002-1022.

The author evaluates the strategic significance of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry since the 1998 tests, with emphasis on the regional effects of nuclear weapons proliferation & the debate between optimists & pessimists regarding the possibility of accidental war. Both countries have made clear their intentions to weaponize & have deployed delivery systems, but India's nuclear weapons doctrine remains unclear. The article also discusses areas of contention regarding the dangers of weaponization & arms racing, the likelihood of stability in the event of a crisis, & the adequacy of both Indian & Pakistani command & control arrangements. It concludes with a discussion of the stability-instability paradox & the author's provisional agreement with the optimists' assessment of the situation. J. R. Callahan.

Sagan, Scott D

Asian Survey, 2001, 41, 6, Nov-Dec, 1064-1086.

The article examines the potential consequences of recent nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Proliferation optimists claim that nuclear weapons development will serve as a deterrent; proliferation pessimists, by contrast, believe that such development will only increase the probability of nuclear accidents & inadvertent war. The author concludes that the emerging evidence supports the pessimistic interpretation, & supports his conclusion by comparing & contrasting the present situation in India & Pakistan with historical examples involving the US & the former USSR during the Cold War. He also outlines the lessons for theory development & the policy implications of his argument. J. R. Callahan.

Biswas, Shampa

Alternatives, 2001, 26, 4, Oct-Dec, 485-522.

This paper looks at the influence of race, or "nuclear apartheid," on India's decision to embrace nuclearization. It argues that the Indian government's adoption of the nuclear-apartheid position represents a statement against racialized exclusion & a racialized global hierarchy. The paper begins by examining Hindu nationalism within contemporary India. It then discusses India's nuclear-apartheid position in light of two arms control treaties - the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty & the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The paper also looks at new forms of racialization that are emerging in contemporary India as a result of the nuclear-apartheid approach. The paper concludes by arguing that the issue of race must be considered within any discussion of global peace or justice. K. Larsen.

Nizamani, Haider K

Contemporary Security Policy, 2001, 22, 2, Aug, 27-48.

The May 1998 nuclear test initiated by India & followed by Pakistan call into question the effectiveness of international nonproliferation regimes such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These explosions demonstrate that the norm against nuclear testing & the spread of nuclear weapons is not as strong as the norm against their use. A closer look at the dynamics of politics of nuclear weapons in India & Pakistan proves the primacy of domestic politics as the determining factor behind the 1998 tests. The international community's attitude toward India & Pakistan proves that the proliferation issue has been subsumed by other concerns such as economic cooperation in the case of India, & international terrorism in the case of Pakistan. Unless the norm against the spread of nuclear weapons becomes as strong as the norm against their use, the world is destined to live with de facto nuclear powers like India & Pakistan. Adapted from the source document.

Mey, Holger H

Comparative Strategy, 2001, 20, 3, July-Sept, 241-249.

A broad norm against nuclear weapons has not established itself in Germany. A brief overview of Germany's current "non-debate" regarding nuclear weapons shows that discussion concentrates on related issues like proliferation, missile defense, & arms control, & not on NATO strategy per se. An examination of German nuclear interests & their implications for continued reliance on US extended deterrence demonstrates that nuclear issues must be addressed more explicitly, but also that any broadbased norm rejecting the role of nuclear weapons in Germany's security is not on the horizon. Adapted from the source document.

Sherrill, Clifton W

Comparative Strategy, 2001, 20, 3, July-Sept, 259-270.

Japanese, American, & East Asian security interests would all be better served by a Japanese state that publicly admits to possession & accepts the responsibility of nuclear weapons. Japan can no longer rely on the US security guarantee &, in particular, on the American nuclear deterrent; & for internal political & security reasons Japan should not be dependent on others to provide Japanese security in this era of proliferation. Adapted from the source document.

Stott-Despoja, Natasha; Bartlett, Andrew

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2001, 55, 2, July, 287-300.

This paper investigates the opinions of Australia's youth regarding defense planning & spending, national security, & peace issues in the context of ANZUS. It also examines young people's views of the US-Australia alliance, security threat, & nuclear war. Most Australian youth are against the proliferation of nuclear arms, a situation that could cause a "strategic dilemma" between the US & Australia, especially in light of George W. Bush's determination to investigate a missile defense system. The paper concludes that because Australia's youth still have many unanswered questions regarding defense issues, they may soon begin to seriously question the US-Australia alliance itself. 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

Barletta, Michael Anthony

Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2001, 61, 12, June, 4938-A.

Argentine and Brazilian behaviors contradict central expectations of leading theories of nuclear proliferation and security regimes. These states sought the option to develop nuclear weapons despite enjoying a relatively benign external security environment; rejected the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at harm to their security, economic, and political interests; and devoted scarce financial and diplomatic resources to establish an unnecessary and inefficient bilateral nuclear regime. Neorealist and neoliberal theories misconstrue these behaviors. Pluralist theories aptly focus on domestic politics, but fail to explain how sub-national actors identify and promote their interests. This dissertation develops a constructivist approach to empirical research, designed generally to analyze how shared ideas shape political behavior, and specifically how political actors build proliferation coalitions and attribute meaning to atomic energy. This study proposes framing analysis to explain how shared conceptual schema are created and transformed through public discourse and political struggle. In framing, actors draw upon competing norms, ideas, and information about their environment, first to identify their interests regarding policy alternatives, and then to advance their interests by mobilizing coalitions and justifying their actions. Because framing entails commitment and organizational and rhetorical institutionalization, persuasive frames tend to endure. Framing thus enables action in the present, but constrains appropriate behavior in the future. By incorporating frames in empirical analysis, researchers can better understand and anticipate actors' behavior. Application to the Brazilian-Argentine experience reveals how domestic legitimacy can outweigh international interests in determining state participation in international regimes, and why the intrinsic ambiguity of nuclear technological development may be more important than external security threats in shaping the domestic politics of proliferation. It also demonstrates that even when states defy the international community, global norms can nevertheless impose serious constraints on their behavior. This study employs historical process tracing, cross-national comparison, textual analysis, and counterfactual reasoning to analyze data collected through extensive field research, including two hundred interviews with military and civilian officials and other participants conducted in Washington, DC, Brazil, and Argentina.

Khan, Saira

Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences, 2001, 61, 12, June, 4940-A.

Hamill, James; Lee, Donna

International Relations, 2001, 15, 4, Apr, 33-59.

Argues that South African diplomacy in the postapartheid era has not been as inconsistent & chaotic as generally claimed but has realized some positive results in terms of both world order & its own self-interest. In addition, South Africa is making considerable progress in establishing itself as a key player in the post-Cold War international system. However, it has failed to develop a pattern of positive intervention at regional or subregional levels. A "middle power" approach is used to identify patterns in South African diplomatic behaviors. Three cases are examined as examples of South Africa's use of middle power status as a diplomatic strategy: Pretoria's facilitating role in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations; South Africa's bold initiative on the Lockerbie issue; & its attempts at conflict resolution/coalition building with its African neighbors. Problems facing South African efforts to be an effective middle power are discussed along with the potential effect of basic structural changes in the international system on the viability of middle power activism. J. Lindroth.

Khan, Saira

International Relations, 2001, 15, 4, Apr, 61-77.

Explores the consequences of nuclear proliferation within the realm of protracted conflicts in South Asia. A synopsis of scholarly definitions of protracted conflict is followed by an examination of the rationale behind differing definitions; the relationship between crisis & war; & conditions under which protracted conflicts could be resolved. Protracted conflicts in South Asia are described. A discussion of the conflict between India & Pakistan that has been ongoing since 1947 gives special attention to the nuclear status of both nations, the Brasstacks crisis of 1986-87, & the Kashmir & Kargil crises of 1990. The ineffectiveness of accommodation initiatives taken by Indian & Pakistani leaders is pointed out to argue that other crises are more apt to erupt in situations where nuclear weapons act as deterrents for conventional warfare, creating situations in which resolution becomes more difficult. It is also contended that a "no-war" situation between two nuclear adversaries is likely to prolong conflict. Suggestions are made for improving the situation in South Asia. The serious implications for policy formation are discussed. J. Lindroth.

Youkang, Du

China Report, 2001, 37, 2, Apr-June, 141-163.

In the aftermath of the Cold War & the confrontation pattern characterizing US-Pakistan & USSR-India relations, the balance of power in South Asia has shifted. Regionalization & globalization of the South Asian economies have exerted a positive influence on security, but nuclear war may still ensue due to the India-Pakistan arms race & conflict over Kashmir. Less prominent conflicts based in ethnic & religious divisions, the long-term impact of the war in Afghanistan, & policies of major external powers will influence regional security. People's Republic of China-India relations are also impacted by the US defense against China. It is concluded that China is in a position to positively influence South Asian security & stability. M. Pflum.

Fahmy, Nabil

Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 8, 2, summer, 111-117.

Global arms control & nonproliferation regimes face particular challenges in the wake of the Cold War. Three pertinent policy issues are the question of developing global nuclear disarmament processes; how to deal with Pakistani, Indian, & Israeli nuclearization; & the increasing unilateralism of US arms control policy. These matters cast a cloud of uncertainty over the global disarmament movement, & especially has serious implications for the proliferation problems in the Middle East. The author demonstrates the failure of past policy approaches that have centered on particular nations such as Iraq, Iran, & Syria while neglecting the matter in others, chiefly Israel, which is the sole country in the Middle East not belonging to any nonproliferation or arms control pact. Along with the rest of the international community, the Middle East will be affected by the spread of military & biotechnology that may foster proliferation. The author urges a renewed emphasis on developing comprehensive arms control for US policy regarding the Middle East. K. Coddon.

Kampani, Gaurav

Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 2001, 45, 2, spring, 241-257.

Discusses how the US should deal with India's decision to develop nuclear-armed delivery systems. The broad Indian consensus in favor of nuclear weapons is noted, along with the belief of leaders in New Delhi that possessing nuclear weapons is a way to earn international respect. The Clinton administration's India policy included economic & technological sanctions accompanied by high-level dialogues with New Delhi aimed at convincing them to limit their strategic capabilities & conform with international treaties. Reasons for this approach's failure are discussed, maintaining that tacit recognition undermines the nonproliferation norm & promotes vertical proliferation in South Asia. Suggestions are made for a more workable US policy that recognizes India's use of nuclear weapons as a means of national self-expression & ends public opposition to India's nuclear program & the dialogue with New Delhi. However, economic & technological sanctions should continue, in hopes that Indian leaders will assess the costs of developing an operational nuclear capability, & the US should simultaneously strive to delegitimize notions of national security based on nuclear armaments. J. Lindroth.

Albright, David; O'Neill, Kevin

Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 8, 3, fall-winter, 54-66.

The current status on international sanctions & obligations imposed on Iraq after the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Iraq's program to acquire weapons of mass destruction, & proposals to address the deadlock between Iraq & the US Security Council on weapons inspection are discussed. UN-sponsored sanctions on Iraqi oil production & imports have prevented a military-industrial buildup, but caused visible welfare decline among the Iraqi population. Between 1991 & 1998, sanctions & weapons inspections slowly eroded until the latter came to a halt. US President George W. Bush has proposed reformed international sanctions against Iraq & an overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. With Iraqi weapons proliferation increasing, it is concluded that intrusive & rigorous nuclear inspections & monitoring in Iraq should be introduced. M. Pflum.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z

Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 2001, 45, 2, spring, 259-280.

Discusses changing perspectives about Israel's long-range security. Information obtained from interviews with foreign policy officials, politicians, journalists, academics, & businessmen indicated that Israel is better equipped to deal with potential aggressors than ever before due to its efficient early-warning system, powerful air force, & nuclear capability. Russia's decline as a world power deprived Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, & Yemen of their key patron-protector, which left Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization as Israel's major protagonist. The limited military options of most Arab states are contrasted with Israel's production of sophisticated military equipment & rapidly expanding high-tech sector, & potential threats of conventional war, low-intensity conflict, missile proliferation, or terrorism are assessed. It is noted that clashes between "new thinking" & traditional patterns of belief/behavior are apparent in the political, economic, religious, social, & cultural arenas. Ways these challenges have affected strategic goals, procurement, personnel, & military readiness are discussed, along with differences of opinion over the significance of the Golan Heights & the meaning of changes in military affairs for Israeli security. J. Lindroth.

Russell, Richard L

Survival, 2001, 43, 2, summer, 69-79.

The debate over missile & nuclear proliferation has been clouded by some misplaced liberal assumptions. To focus on "rogue" states with malignant designs is to misdiagnose nuclear proliferation as a "disease." Nuclear proliferation is much more a "symptom" of the struggle for power that characterizes international relations, with or without superpower conflict. One such area of proliferation may be right under our noses, not in a so-called rogue state, but in a key US ally in the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia. There is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has already chosen a nuclear deterrent. They could work clandestinely to develop a nuclear capability, much as they did to procure ballistic missiles. Washington should not assume that a close regional ally such as Saudi Arabia would be loath to jeopardize that relationship by working at cross-purposes with declared US policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction & ballistic missiles. Such an assumption would profoundly overestimate the Saudi confidence in US protection, & would fail to recognize that security interests - not in any sense an innate friendship - are the driving forces behind policy in international politics. Adapted from the source document.

Scheinman, Lawrence (Review of: Perkovich, George)

International Studies Review, 2001, 3, 1, spring, 146-148.

Hymans, Jacques E C

Security Studies, 2001, 10, 3, spring, 153-185.

Following some theoretical explanations of nuclear proliferation, four hypotheses are advanced regarding the nuclear behavior of Argentina, focusing on the 1950s-1990s period, particularly the early 1960s-early 1980s, when the North became most worried about this country's nuclear intentions & capabilities. Declassified documentary data from external & internal government sources, insider interviews, & archival materials are drawn on test the hypotheses. It is concluded that, at least through 1989, Argentina embraced a position of "nonoppositional nationalism." Argentina sought to develop its nuclear capacities & technologies without any outside restrictions, particularly from the North. In accord with all hypotheses, the more diplomatic pressure exerted from other nations to agree with nuclear nonproliferation policies, the more Argentina asserted its nationalism & nuclear strength; military action, however, could moderate the expressive nationalist content of the state's nuclear policies, as it did in this case with pressure from Brazil. Hypotheses also explain Argentina's position regarding nuclear weapons, which it had no desire to acquire. K. Hyatt Stewart.

Malik, J Mohan

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 2000, 22, 3, Dec, 445-478.

This article surveys the People's Republic of China's policy toward the nuclear nonproliferation regime & contests the view that China has now completed the transition from a challenger to an upholder of the global nonproliferation regime. It argues that "the learning curve hypothesis" & the "bureaucratic politics & profit motives" arguments provide only a partial explanation of China's shifting but ambiguous & contradictory policy toward nonproliferation. China has cleverly played "the proliferation card" by exploiting loopholes in the nonproliferation regime & contradictions in major power relationships so as to serve its national security interests. The article examines the factors that have led Beijing to disregard the nonproliferation regime in the past & might make it continue to do so in the future. It also analyzes the changing Asian security environment & its impact on China's nonproliferation commitments in the future. Adapted from the source document.

Ahmed, Samina

Third World Quarterly, 2000, 21, 5, Oct, 781-793.

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional & sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the US's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons & their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India-Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorized, or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic & external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security. Adapted from the source document.

Grillot, Suzette R

International Politics, 2000, 37, 2, June, 185-211.

Nuclear weapons proliferation was expected to be a correlate of an unstable post-Cold War multipolar international environment. To the contrary, many states that previously sought, developed, or inherited nuclear weapons denuclearized. Particularly surprising was Ukraine's decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union. Neorealism cannot explain this denuclearization, so I turn to alternative approaches - rational institutionalism & liberal identification - to examine Ukraine's nuclear decision. I find that material factors, such as financial benefits, payoffs, & exchanges, played some role in determining Ukraine's nuclear behavior. Yet, various nonmaterial factors, such as Ukraine's sense of community & belonging, perceptions of the democratic peace, & conceptions of the beliefs & values it shared with the West, had greater influence on the decision to denuclearize. Adapted from the source document.

Riecke, Henning

The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2000, 23, 1, Mar, 25-51.

Since 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have run a campaign to stem the spread of WMD. NATO tries to raise the costs & reduce the benefits of WMD proliferation. The alliance, however, still utilizes its nuclear posture to deter the use of all classes of WMD. The sobering status of proliferation indicates that the usual suspect states have not renounced the use of WMD at all. How is this possible? Neoliberal & constructivist hypothesis are applied to consider the effects of NATO's nonproliferation campaign on other states' decisions to use WMD. While NATO assists several nonproliferation regimes, it points to the strategic relevance of WMD & legitimacy of their use. States in NATO's vicinity might be successfully deterred from using WMD against the alliance, but they do not change their beliefs about the applicability of such weapons. Adapted from the source document.

Burr, William; Richelson, Jeffrey T

International Security, 2000-2001, 25, 3, winter, 54-99.

The author traces the history of the Kennedy & Johnson administrations' concerns & reactions to the People's Republic of China's development of nuclear capabilities. This history describes US-PRC relations, the political functioning of US leaders in the Cold War climate, & their thoughts about curbing nuclear proliferation. The author reviews Chairman Mao Zedong's decision to develop nuclear weapons. US intelligence made wrong assumptions about the direction of PRC nuclear development & was also unsuccessful in obtaining information about the project. President Kennedy considered PRC nuclear capability a national security threat & sought collaboration with the USSR to "anonymously" take out PRC nuclear facilities, a suggestion that the USSR rebuffed. During 1962 & 1963, the CIA increased its efforts to gather intelligence on PRC actions through U-2 photography. Kennedy's administration approached the Nationalist Chinese government to consider joint efforts to prevent China's acquisition of nuclear weapons. US Dept of State analysts successfully persuaded senior officials that a nuclear PRC would not increase its aggressive activities. President Johnson's restraint highlights the process of choosing among diplomatic, economic, & military options. An astute assessment of those variables in choosing a response to nuclear proliferation remains a challenge. L. A. Hoffman.

Domin, Gregory Paul

Journal of Political Science, 2000, 28, 45-82.

This essay analyzes the factors underlying nuclear tensions in South Asia & how governments & organizations working toward nonproliferation & arms control are prepared - or not prepared - to deal with this problem in the post-Cold War era. The essay then examines the different methods of disarmament, nuclear ownership, & bargaining in India & Pakistan, two states that are only beginning to learn the utility of arms control in maintaining nuclear stability in South Asia. The essay concludes by making several recommendations that can be met only by concurrent efforts among a variety of parties. Although the highest responsibility remains that of the governments in the region, attention & action from parties outside of the region are also needed to benefit nonproliferation efforts in South Asia, as well as maintaining nuclear stability in the area. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

Nizamani, Haider K

Millennium, 2000, 29, 1, spring, 141-151.

A review essay on book by (1) Itty Abraham, Making of the Indian Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed Books, 1998); (2) Samina Ahmed & David Cortright (Eds), Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame U Press, 1998); (3) Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); & (4) George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: U California Press, 1999). The review article argues that scholarly accounts & explanations of the intricacies of the nuclear imbroglio in South Asia closely resemble the story of the blind men describing an elephant. The article discusses various perspectives employed to study nuclear politics & policies in the subcontinent. It shows that tenets of political realism guide most analysts on the issue, but of late there have been efforts to go beyond the traditional deterrence theory & analyze nuclear weapons politics with the help of works of scholars like Michel Foucault. The essay concludes that in order to understand & appreciate dynamics of nuclear politics in the subcontinent there is room for conducting research that goes beyond traditional security studies. Adapted from the source document.

Nizamani, Haider K (Review of: Hagerty, Devin)

Millennium, 2000, 29, 1, spring, 141-151.

Dorraj, Manochehr

Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies, 1999, 18, 4, Dec, 23-30.

This essay delineates the causes & the consequences of Indian & Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 in a global context. In this connection, the central role of dispute over Kashmir as a triggering issue in the recent Indian & Pakistani arms race is analyzed. The essay also critically examines the inconsistencies in major powers' response toward nuclear proliferation in South Asia as compared to other parts of the world & expounds on the future prospects & the global impact of the Indian-Pakistani race. Adapted from the source document.